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ABSTRACT 
 
ETHNIC POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF 
VOLGA TATARS 
 
Türkmen, Hasan Selçuk 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Mark Padraig Almond 
January 2012 
 
 
 This thesis analyses an under-examined subject in the discipline of 
International Relations, ethnic politics, with reference to the case of Volga Tatars, the 
second largest ethnic group after Russians within the Russian Federation. Ethnicity is 
one of the phenomena that are at the core of International Relations. Its significance 
can be observed in debates on nation-state, identity, and international and internal 
conflicts. The phenomenon of ethnic politics transcends the traditional study of 
ethnicity in the discipline, which confines it to the study of conflicts. However, 
ethnicity is not conflictual by its nature and matters beyond conflict. Therefore, 
ethnic politics can significantly affect domestic and foreign policies of states, and for 
that matter the world politics at the global level. The very processes of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation in 
general, and Volga Tatars in particular, represent a perfect microcosm of how ethnic 
politics is significant in international relations.    
 
 
 
Key Words: Ethnic politics, Ethnic Conflict, Soviet nationalities policy, Volga 
Tatars, Tatarstan, Turkey-Russian Relations 
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ÖZET 
 
ULUSLARARASI ĠLĠġKĠLERDE ETNĠK POLĠTĠKALAR: VOLGA TATARLARI 
ÖRNEĞĠ 
 
Türkmen, Hasan Selçuk 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler 
Tez DanıĢmanı: Prof. Mark Padraig Almond 
Ocak 2012 
 
 
Bu tez Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler disiplininde yeterince incelenmemiĢ bir konuyu, 
etnik politikaları, Rusya Federasyonu içinde Ruslardan sonra ikinci büyük etnik grup 
olan Volga Tatarları örneği üzerinden incelemektedir. Etnisite, Uluslararası 
ĠliĢkiler‟in merkezinde yer alan fenomenlerden biridir. Etnisitenin önemi ulus-devlet, 
kimlik, uluslararası çatıĢmalar ve devlet içi çatıĢmalar konularındaki tartıĢmalarda 
gözlemlenebilir. Etnik politikalar kavramı, etnisiteyi çatıĢmalara sınırlayan 
geleneksel yaklaĢımın ötesine geçer.  Etnisite, her durumda çatıĢmacı değildir ve 
çatıĢmanın ötesinde önem arz eder. Bu nedenle, etnik politikalar devletlerin iç ve dıĢ 
politikalarını ve böylelikle küresel düzeyde dünya politikalarını etkileyebilir. Genel 
ölçekte Sovyetler Birliği‟nin dağılması ve Rusya Federasyonu‟nun kurulması, 
özellikle de Volga Tatarları, etnik politikaların uluslararası iliĢkilerdeki önemini 
ortaya koyan yetkin örnek durumlardır.   
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Etnik politikalar, Etnik çatıĢma, Sovyet milliyetler politikası, 
Volga Tatarları, Tataristan, Türk-Rus ĠliĢkileri 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
“Three rings for the Elven-kings under the sky 
Seven for the Dwarf-lords in their halls of stone 
Nine for mortal Men doomed to die.” 
 
- J. R. R. Tolkien 
 
 
 These famous verses on the One Ring of Tolkien‟s Middle Earth have their 
own fatal-to-utter meaning in their fictional world. However, they perfectly reflect a 
sheer reality: Even in a fantastic fiction which is a product of escapism, the author 
needs to organise people and countries around the principle of self-determination, 
namely on the basis of nationality/ethnicity/race.  
 
 The organisation of the modern political world on the basis of the principle of 
self-determination is today taken for granted; it may even seem to be an inherent 
feature of the world to inattentive eyes. The questions were striking to me when I 
first realised them: Why the political units are organised around the principle of 
nationality, but not that of another categorical/identical ascription? Why is it that the 
2 
 
state cannot be possible without a nation, which either truly or artificially carries a 
notion of ethnicity? Why only nations can claim right for self-determination; while, 
say, a social class or scholars of a scientific branch cannot? These questions, 
ultimately, have been the main drives for me in choosing the subject ethnic politics in 
this thesis. 
  
1.1 Research Question and Synopsis 
 
 This thesis is based around the question that “how does ethnic politics, 
without and beyond turning into ethnic conflict, influence domestic and foreign 
policies of states?” Ethnic conflict has been a settled area of study within the 
International Relations (IR) discipline, especially after the end of the Cold War. 
However, the examination of ethnicity under the rubric of “conflict” mistakenly 
limits the comprehensiveness of the phenomenon. Therefore, there is a considerable 
gap in the literature in terms of defining the influence of ethnicity through non-
conflictual politics.   
 
 The second chapter begins with a literature review outlining the genealogy of 
studies in IR discipline that can be gathered under the rubric of ethnic politics. For 
this purpose, the main academic journals analysing ethnic politics, namely Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Nationalities Papers, and 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, are reviewed and analysed. Concurrently, the 
interdisciplinarity of the subject is problematised and the place of the studies of 
ethnic politics within the IR discipline is delineated. Further, analyses of ethnic 
politics by theories of International Relations are examined.  
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 In the third chapter, the nationalities policies of the Soviet Union are 
contextualised with reference to ethnic politics. The roles of ethnic politics in the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation are 
analysed. This chapter, at the same time, constitutes the broader background for the 
main case study, that of the Volga Tatars, in the fourth chapter.    
 
  The fourth chapter is a historical analysis of the case of the Volga Tatars from 
the Muscovite conquest of Kazan to the contemporary post-Soviet period. The case 
of Volga Tatars provides a perfect example of the influence of ethnic politics in 
international relations. Throughout different phases of history, Volga Tatars 
influenced the domestic and foreign policies of Russia, at times significantly.  
 
 In the fifth chapter, the role of Tatarstan, the titular republic of Volga Tatars, 
in Turkish-Russian relations is analysed in order to exemplify the influence of ethnic 
politics in foreign policies. The analysis demonstrates that ethnic politics can 
significantly matter beyond conflict in international relations.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 In the second chapter, literature review and content analysis are conducted. 
The third chapter is built upon historicising and contextualising. The fourth chapter is 
a historical analysis that includes examination of certain specific periods and issues 
of the Volga Tatar history that are rarely analysed in academic studies. For this 
purpose, books, periodicals, and newspapers not only in English but also in Tatar and 
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Turkish are examined. The political history of Volga Tatars is yet an understudied 
chapter of Russian history, which can provide significant insights for students of 
International Relations. Therefore, this subject can be more deeply analysed through 
field research and full access to documents in Russian and Tatar. The fifth chapter 
provides a foreign policy analysis of the specific issue of the role of Tatarstan in 
Turkish-Russian relations. The speeches of key actors in this respect and the main 
relevant documents (agreements, constitutions, declarations) are analysed. Therefore, 
this chapter is built upon discourse and content analysis as methods.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ETHNIC POLITICS STUDIES AND THEIR PLACE WITHIN THE 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISCIPLINE 
 
 
 
 
“We must start by noticing that „ethnic‟ identity is not a thing in itself, or for eternity. 
It is an identity that is constantly forged. […] The kind of ethnic strife we have been 
seeing in the last two decades is not at all comparable to the wave of nationalism the 
world-system knew from the early nineteenth century up to the mid twentieth 
century.”  
 
- Immanuel Wallerstein, Utopistics (1998)  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a genealogy of ethnic politics studies and to 
problematise their place within the International Relations (IR) discipline. This 
analysis is carried out with reference to both ethnic politics studies as a separate 
subfield under the IR discipline and the attitude of IR theories towards ethnicity and 
ethnic politics. It is argued that the significance of ethnicity and ethnic politics has 
been underestimated in the IR discipline. Therefore, theories and analyses of ethnic 
 6 
 
politics have remained scattered and unconnected. Further, the extent of ethnic 
politics and nature of ethnicity have been mistakenly reduced to conflict or simply 
dismissed as a source of conflict. 
 
2.2 A Genealogy  
 Ethnicity and its influences on international politics had gone unnoticed in the 
discipline of International Relations until the decolonisation movements emerged in 
the Third World. The nation-state had been taken for granted as the universal form of 
political organisation. The decolonisation movements demonstrated that the nation-
state was not “inscribed into the nature of things” (Gellner 1983: 49) and ethnicity 
matters for international politics. The end of the Cold War and outburst of ethnic 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space necessarily made International Relations discipline 
to attach significance to ethnicity. However, the study of ethnicity and ethnic politics 
has remained epiphenomenal in the discipline as yet.   
 
2.2.1 Studies before the End of the Cold War 
 
Studies of ethnic politics within the scope of the IR discipline dates back to 
the immediate aftermath of the decolonisation movements in the post-Second World 
War period, especially to the 1960s (Ryan 1990: xxii). Decolonisation, while 
granting independence, left these new states on their own in consolidating their 
nation-states, the universal political organisation of the twentieth century (Riggs 
1994: 588). Ethnic conflicts that broke out during this era demonstrated that ethnic 
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groups, whose importance had been sacrificed on the altar of the nation-state, can 
play a role in world politics (Gurr and Harff 1994: 2).  
Having their initial raison d'être in explaining the ethnic controversies that 
erupted after decolonisation, early studies of ethnic politics mostly remained content 
with offering shallow and temporary surveys of the cases at stake. Though, few later-
to-be milestone works, such as Fredrik Barth‟s study (1969), were created during this 
period. The dominance of the Cold War in the IR discipline, as well as in political 
life, arguably had the greatest share in the neglect of ethnic politics during the initial 
period of the emergence of studies on the subject. However, the Cold War is indeed 
far from bearing the whole responsibility, for the reasons that will be set forth and 
elaborated subsequently.  
A stronger rise and standing out of ethnic politics studies in the discipline was 
during the 1970s and 1980s. It was in these decades when the most prominent 
nationalism scholars, Anthony Smith, Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and 
Walker Connor, published their magna opera on the phenomenon of nationalism per 
se; and when the first academic journals specifically devoted to the studies of ethnic 
politics, such as Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
and Nationalities Papers started to be published.  Although nationalism is a separate 
area of study, more exclusively belonging to political science and sociology, the 
relationship between ethnic politics studies and nationalism studies have been 
mutually constructive and mutually cultivating. Those two specific areas of studies 
have inevitably been interlaced to a certain degree and tended to converge by the 
virtue of the fact that concepts of ethnicity and nation are interlocked. However, 
during this period, ethnicity was still a recent phenomenon (Horowitz 1985: 4), and it 
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was only Anthony Smith among the nationalism scholars who included the word 
“ethnic” in the title of his books (1981; 1986).   
During 1970s and 1980s, particular scholars were significant contributors to 
the initiation of ethnic politics studies within the IR context.  In 1975, Nathan Glazer, 
a sociologist, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a scholar of political science and a 
politician as well, published a milestone book, titled Ethnicity: Theory and 
Experience, which they co-edited after a conference under the same rubric held in 
1972. Already in 1963, two scholars had co-authored another book, Beyond the 
Melting Pot, which focused on the ethnic groups in New York. Although it contained 
inspirational insights for future studies of ethnic politics, it was dominantly a 
sociological analysis. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, on the other hand, had been 
one of the precursors of the significance of ethnicity in world politics and of ethnic 
studies in academia. The authors concisely portrayed the condition of the studies on 
the subject: 
Little in this field has been resolved. We are all beginners here. We 
consider this volume very much an initial contribution in an 
enterprise to be continued. [...] There is a phenomenon here that is, 
in ways not yet explicated, no mere survival but intimately and 
organically bound up with major trends of modern societies (Glazer 
and Moynihan 1975: 25-26).    
 
 Nathan and Moynihan, significantly, considered ethnicity beyond a minor 
concept of social stratification. The authors envisaged that ethnicity has prospects to 
be a rising phenomenon in world politics, an influential factor in shaping foreign 
policies, and an indispensable reality of the post-Second World War world.  
In 1985, Donald L. Horowitz, a professor of Law and Political Science, one 
of few scholars writing exclusively on ethnic politics since the beginning of 1970s, 
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published his later-to-be a primer book, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. The very first 
lines heralded the inevitable significance of ethnic politics, which was only to be 
fully recognized in the 1990s: 
The importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, 
as a phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can 
no longer be denied. [...] Ethnicity is at the centre of politics in 
country after country, a potent source of challenges to the cohesion 
of states and of international tension (Horowitz 1985: xi). 
 
 Horowitz not only delineated salience of ethnic politics, which was 
incrementally emerging from obscurity, but also underlined its irresistible break into 
academia, with his locus classicus line that “ethnicity has fought and bled and  
burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness” (Horowitz 1985: xi).  
During the 1980s the realities of the Cold War ceased to have their absolute 
hold in the discipline. The focus deflected to the looming end of the Cold War and to 
its sweeping and numerous consequences. Critical approaches against the 
pervasiveness of the dogmas of the Cold War emerged (Lepgold and Nincic 2001: 
23). During the 1980s, however, the emphasis was not on ethnic politics per se but 
on the philosophical questions about the concept of nation-state. After all, with 
communism seemed to fail in the Soviet Union, this was a period when the dominant 
ideologies of the twentieth century were being questioned.  
 
2.2.2 Studies after the End of the Cold War 
 
Studies of ethnic politics blossomed with the end of the Cold War, 
specifically with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of communist 
regimes in the Eastern Europe. After the bipolarity of international politics was 
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unchained, the bipolar friction and nuclear threat ceased to be the main security 
issue. The most significant matter which arose in the international sphere suddenly 
became the insurgence of ethnic groups within the dissolved multinational regimes.  
Therefore, the focus of academic lenses of ethnic studies turned from the third 
world to Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. Since this geographical area was at 
the heart of politics and thus of the academic endeavour of IR, studies of ethnic 
politics accordingly found a relatively more significant place within the discipline. 
Thus, starting from the 1980s and during the 1990s, scholars from IR background, in 
contrast to previous scholars who were mostly from anthropology, philosophy, 
sociology, and political science backgrounds, specialised on the studies of ethnic 
politics. Consequently, broad studies and projects were initiated, such as Edward 
Azar‟s Conflict and Peace Databank (1980) and Ted Gurr‟s Minorities at Risk 
(1993). 
However, in spite of the relevance and significance of ethnic politics in 
international relations, studies of ethnic politics have not been appreciated 
sufficiently within the discipline. The role of ethnic politics has been neglected by IR 
theories and its importance for national and international security tends to be 
overlooked. The reasons behind this neglect are twofold, that is both on the part of 
the separate field of ethnic politics studies and of the broader discipline of IR.  
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2.3 “Pandaemonium”1 in Ethnic Politics Studies 
After the end of the Cold War, ethnic politics, especially in the form of ethnic 
conflict, boomed. A broad literature with plethora of studies, very different in terms 
of disciplinary backgrounds and approaches but in one way or another within the 
boundaries of the IR discipline, were added to the literature of ethnic politics. 
Although most of the prominent works start with accepting that there remain to be a 
need for a major theory, there is not any general theory of ethnic politics which is 
acknowledged and embraced in the field as yet (Hale 2008: 30). The field still seems 
to suffer from disorder and a need of an organizing theory. As Ernst Haas argued 
about the state of nationalism studies, the field of ethnic politics also suffers from the 
"proverbial elephant problem” (1986: 707), which is an analogy for grasping only 
parts of a phenomenon without seeing the whole limits of it.  
 
2.3.1 The Theoretical Background of the Studies of Ethnic Politics 
 
 The preliminary theoretical background upon which ethnic politics studies in 
IR is built is derived from a variety of frameworks offered in sociological and 
anthropological studies as well as in classical philosophical works. Ethnic politics 
studies have selected these frameworks generally along two broad questions: the 
nature of ethnicity and ethnic loyalty/consciousness/identification, and the possibility 
of multiethnic societies. The analyses of multiethnic societies are distinguished along 
incompatibility, of which well-known representatives are John Stuart Mill and 
                                                     
1
 In John Milton‟s epic poem Paradise Lost, Pandaemonium is the capital of Satan where he sat “high 
on a throne of royal state” (Kean 2005: 94). Moynihan borrowed it as the title of his book published in 
1993, „Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics‟, to depict the tumultuousness of ethnic 
conflicts after the end of the Cold War.  
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Woodrow Wilson, and consociationalism, that is characterized by J. S. Furnivall‟s 
plural society theory to which Anthony Smith also made substantial contributions 
(Ryan 1990: 4-5). Mill (2009 [1861]: 344) argued that 
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of 
different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, 
especially if they read and speak different languages, the united 
public opinion necessary to the working of representative 
government cannot exist.  
 
 Furnivall, on the other hand, suggested that different ethnic groups within the 
same society can peacefully coexist, except for in the marketplace. Therefore, in 
order to provide coexistence in the marketplace, it would be necessary to impose 
certain frameworks of rule (Rex 1959: 115-116).  
With the risk of simplifying a vast philosophical debate, the approaches to the 
nature of ethnicity can be outlined as divided between primordialism and 
constructivism (Hale 2008: 15). Primordialism asserts that the prototypes of ethnic 
identification, such as rituals of collectivity and a sense of belonging to a common 
origin, reaches back to time immemorial (Reminick 1983: 47). Therefore, this 
approach treats ethnicity as an ontological given.  
Primordialism is criticised by prominent anthropology scholars, such as 
Fredrik Barth, on the basis of the argument that ethnicity is a category of “ascription 
and identification, thus have characteristic of organizing interaction between people” 
(1969: 10). By defining ethnicity as a superordinate category of identity and status 
(Barth 1969: 17), he opposed primordialism on the basis of situationalism 
(circumstantialism), which implies that ethnicity is a social construction through 
interaction that is necessitated by certain circumstances.  
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Further, instrumentalism, which is mostly inspired by political economy 
(Covers and Merveulen 1997: 2), views ethnicity not as a matter of identity and 
status, but as an instrument constructed for “pursuit of collective interests” (Young 
1983:660). Therefore, these two distinctive categories of situationalism and 
instrumentalism fall into the constructivist approach with respect to their ontological 
assumptions.  
 Primordialism is also discredited to a large extent by nationalism scholars, 
prominently by Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Anderson‟s argument (2006: 
4), although it is specifically on the creation of the sense of nation-ness, reflects the 
punch line of the constructivist approach: 
I will be trying to argue that the creation of these artefacts [i.e. 
nation-ness and nationalism] towards the end of the eighteenth 
century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex „crossing‟ of 
discrete historical forces; but that once created they became 
„modular‟, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of 
self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge 
and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and 
ideological constellations.  
 
 Max Weber, who is accepted as the first in using the term “ethnic group” in a 
scholarly work, adopted an approach that discredits primordialism, in his work titled 
Economy and Society. Weber (1978: 387-288) argued: 
The question of whether conspicuous "racial" differences are based 
on biological heredity or on tradition is usually of no importance as 
far as their effect on mutual attraction or repulsion is concerned. 
[...] We can conclude then that similarity and contrast of physical 
type and custom, regardless of whether they are biologically 
inherited or culturally transmitted, are subject to the same 
conditions of group life, in origin as well as in effectiveness, and 
identical in their potential for group formation.  
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In spite of deriving from solid, though intricate, theoretical bases, ethnic 
politics studies in IR had difficulties to transplant ethnicity with a strong theoretical 
framework into the international relations context. It is argued here is that the 
primary reason of this problem is the deficiency of anchoring a central relational 
question under the focus of inquiry: “How ethnic politics shape/influence the state 
behaviour and/or international politics, which encompasses and incorporates all other 
questions and subtopics that emerge as a result of ethnic politics?” Along with this 
primary reason, centrifugal factors also exist.  
 
2.3.2 Theoretical Frameworks within the Context of International Relations 
 
As indicated beforehand, many scholars of ethnic politics studies in IR 
acknowledge and underline the necessity of a theoretical framework (Horowitz 1971: 
232; Moynihan 1993: 61; Ryan 1990: xiii; Carment 1993: 137). However, they 
generally stay content with acknowledging this necessity or offering frameworks that 
provide insights only for parts of the phenomenon without diagnosing the reason 
why such a theoretical framework cannot be achieved. As a result of the absence of a 
common agenda with a central question, studies of ethnic politics resemble a Pollock 
picture. A huge literature falls under the same rubric but remain disorderly because 
of lack of interconnectedness, although works under each sub-rubric are 
sophisticated in themselves.  
Since the breakthrough of ethnicity into the discipline as a result of the 
emergence of ethnic conflicts, initially in the 1960s and then after 1990, the field of 
ethnic politics studies is generally identified with the term “ethnic conflict”. This 
denomination is inevitably subject to the inference that ethnicity is by definition 
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conflictual and studies of ethnic politics consist of studying conflicts in which ethnic 
groups involve. Although ethnic conflicts have been evidently the most prominent 
and relevant issue, it has turned out to be that ethnic politics is not limited to 
conflicts, even not necessarily conflictual by nature
2
. Hale concisely puts it by saying 
“next to almost every ethnic hotspot lie multiple zones of ethnic peace” (2008: 18).  
Far from being a modality of conflict, ethnic politics has stood out as an enduring 
phenomenon of the post-Cold War international politics. However, limiting ethnic 
politics to ethnic conflict per se have put understanding of and offering solutions for 
particular cases at the centre of the scholarly inquiry, not ethnic politics as a 
phenomenon to be understood.  Consequently, separate scholarly works leaning upon 
separate particular events dominated the field. The issue of denomination, therefore, 
goes beyond to be a semantic detail but it designates the boundaries of the field.  
Being strictly related to those problems elaborated hitherto, the problem of 
the lack of interconnectedness seems to be pervasive in studies of ethnic politics. 
Scholars tend to overlook the theoretical frameworks offered beforehand. This 
interconnectedness hinders the cumulative evolution of the theoretical knowledge 
and the construction of an overarching theory of ethnic politics. To make the case, 
certain examples are helpful.  
Donald Horowitz sets forth a framework for explaining the structure of 
differentiations among ethnic groups (1971: 232). In this framework, “vertical” and 
“horizontal” systems of ethnic stratification are distinguished. Vertical systems 
partake of caste structures and they are generally a result of conquests and captures. 
Therefore, in vertical systems relations between ethnic groups are hierarchical among 
                                                     
2
 “There is no such thing as an inherently ethnic interest or ethnic preference. Instead, we should 
assume ethnic group behavior is motivated by the same kinds of motives that drive human behavior 
more generally in all kinds of situations” (Hale 2008: 52). 
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subordinate and superordinate groups. On the other hand, horizontal systems are 
generally constituted through either annexations
3
 or voluntary migrations, which 
result in parallel ethnic structures. However, Horowitz argues, this does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that social cohesion is higher in horizontal 
systems, on the contrary, vertical systems might prove to be having more social 
cement in time. Building upon this classification, Horowitz analyses political 
interaction among ethnic groups. 
Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff concentrated exactly the same issue that 
Horowitz had, that is types of ethnic groups, the ways in which different ethnic 
groups come together, and political interaction among those groups. They classified 
“politically active ethnic groups” into four: ethnonationalists, indigenous peoples, 
communal contenders, and ethnoclasses (1994: 15). However, this framework is not 
related, compared, or contrasted to the previous one offered by Horowitz. Although 
both Horowitz and Gurr are among the most prominent scholars of ethnic politics, 
because of this lack of interconnectedness, neither of their frameworks is 
acknowledged as a reference point nor evaluated/criticised for improvement or 
replacement by other scholars.   
Henry Hale, in his book published in 2008, problematises the deficiencies of 
current state of theorisation in studies of ethnic politics and proposes an alternative 
“relational” theoretical basis. He argues that theories of ethnic politics fall into two 
broad category: ethnicity-as-conflictual theories and ethnicity-as-epiphenomenal 
theories. He discredits both on the basis of the argument that theories of ethnic 
politics must have solid and firmer grounds (2008: 31). His relational and 
                                                     
3
 Horowitz use “invasion resulting less than conquest” as a way that constitutes horizontal systems. I 
interpreted it as “annexation”.    
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microfoundational theory, having its roots at the psychology of human behaviour, 
comprises two main arguments, which are about the nature of ethnicity and of ethnic 
politics. Primordialist and constructivist views, Hale argues, are not relational, since 
ethnicity can best be seen as an instrument for human beings to neatly categorize and 
simplify and thus make sense of the complex world,  that is to say as an instrument 
for “uncertainty reduction”. Indeed his argument about the nature of ethnicity 
coincides with Barth‟s analysis. Barth (1969: 10) had argued that: 
Ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the 
actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing 
interaction between people. We attempt to relate other 
characteristics of ethnic groups to this primary feature.  
 
Second argument of Hale‟s relational theory sets forth that ethnic politics is 
mainly a way through which human beings can most effectively further their 
interests. Therefore, he conceptualizes ethnic politics as a result stemming from 
individuals‟ desire or intrinsic human behaviour to pursue their various interests 
(Hale 2008: 55), given that interests are broadly defined as both material and 
emotional. This approach overlaps with what Moynihan put forward that significance 
of ethnicity is because it “combines interests with affective ties” (1993: 56).  
As it is attempt to be argued hitherto, one side of the reasons behind ethnic 
politics‟ insufficient appreciation in the discipline is the perplexity and disorder, or 
pandaemonium, in the field of ethnic politics studies, although recently there have 
been comprehensive examinations of the literature and attempts to propose a theory 
that compiles the literature like Hale‟s. The other side of the reasons seems to be the 
neglect of ethnic politics by IR theory. These two sides of reasons are not 
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independent from each other, but they are mutually reinforcing the perplexity and 
neglect in one another respectively.  
 
2.4 Ethnic Politics within the Frameworks of International Relations Theories 
David Carment in 1993 made the observation that “first, the neglect of the 
study of ethnic conflict within international relations theory needs to be rectified” 
(138). The point of reference of this observation was that ethnic politics “presents a 
wide range of challenges for foreign policy and interstate cooperation” (Carment 
1993: 137). With reference to Anthony Birch, Carment (1993: 229) concludes his 
point: 
Interestingly, though many scholars recognize the protractedness of 
ethnic conflicts and their oft violent nature, few have argued that 
this intensity of violence poses a major threat to the viability of the 
contemporary state and international system.  
 
 Carment‟s observations seem to have validly survived as yet. Stephen Ryan 
certifies the observations and argues “the discipline of IR has underestimated the 
significance of ethnic conflict” (1990: xix). He enumerates certain reasons that 
inhibited a full appreciation of ethnicity in the IR discipline. The features of the 
broader ideological context in which twentieth century embedded are the primary 
one among those reasons. Two ideological forces that had shaped the twentieth 
century, liberalism and Marxism, did not attach any significance to ethnicity and 
“tended to be dismissive of ethnic sentiment” (Ryan 1990: xix).   
 This argument is shared by many nationalism and ethnic studies scholars. 
Moynihan describes how ethnicity was disregarded by both “the liberal expectancy” 
 19 
 
and “the Marxist prediction”. The liberal views, based upon the Enlightenment ideas, 
saw ethnicity as a component of primitive and feudal societies that would be 
transcended through progress.  The Marxist prediction, on the other hand, envisaged 
that class would be the overarching identity and ethnicity would be replaced by 
“proletarian internationalism” (Moynihan 1993: 27). Benedict Anderson (1983: 3) 
argues that “the end of the era of nationalism, so long prophesied [by liberalism and 
Marxism], is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally 
legitimate value in the political life of our time”.  
As the second reason, a long tradition in social sciences, as the dominant 
ideologies, has predicted the end of ethnicity, and optimistically believed that 
acculturation or assimilation would prevail (Ryan 1990: xx). With reference to 
Anthony Smith and J. A. Fishman, Ryan underlines the “sociological contempt” and 
prediction of the end of ethnicity from “Durkheim to Deutsch” (1990: xx). The term 
ethnicity per se, as a nascent phenomenon in 1950s and 1960s, and ethnic politics 
indeed had discriminative and racial connotations, which evoked tribalism and 
primitivism. These connotations continued to survive till after 1990s, as it was 
reflected in a 1991 issue of The Economist with a headline read “tribalism revisited” 
and in a 1992 issue of New York Times, which evaluated ethnic conflicts by 
claiming that “the roll call of warring nationalities invokes some forgotten primer on 
the warring tribes of the Dark Ages” (Moynihan 1993: 16-19). However, in time 
ethnicity made its way into academe with a broadened definition that includes any 
kind of subgroups within a society (Glazer and Moynihan 1975: 4). Ryan stipulates 
as the third reason that this attitude of the long tradition in social sciences influenced 
the IR discipline; therefore the realist tradition was committed to the strength of the 
sovereign state and attached no importance to ethnic particularism (1990: xxi). 
 20 
 
 Realist theories of international relations, specifically classical realism and 
structural realism, treat states as unitary actors in the international system, therefore 
they are indifferent to the domestic environments, and by definition to ethnic politics 
(Lobell and Mauceri 2004: 1). Ethnic politics is seen as a “change in unit level”; 
thereby it would not matter for the international system (Waltz 2000: 5). 
Consequently, it can be argued that the neglect of ethnic politics in IR theory is 
primarily caused by the dominance of realism, given that the realist tradition has 
dominated IR theory and together with liberal theories has constituted “mainstream 
IR”.  
Neoclassical realism, on the other hand, acknowledges the role of domestic 
politics as an intervening variable between the international system and state 
behaviour (Schweller 2004: 164). The domestic politics variables that neoclassical 
realism formulates are elite consensus, government/regime vulnerability, social 
cohesion, and elite cohesion (Schweller 2004: 169). “Ethnic animosities”, as a 
component of social cohesion, are taken into account as a potential source of conflict 
along with “divergent class interests, economic inequalities, competing political 
goals, and normative conflicts” (Schweller 2004: 175). Therefore, ethnic politics is 
indirectly incorporated into the framework of neoclassical realism. However, it is 
seen as epiphenomenal and solely as a source of conflict and fragmentation, a view 
that reduces ethnic politics exclusively to one dimension.  
 It is possible to argue that ethnic politics, after all, may not pose a challenge 
to neither realist theories, save neoclassical realism, nor to neoliberalism. These 
theories can simply ignore ethnic politics within their theoretical logical consistency 
without any threat to their theoretical framework. However, for liberal theory of 
international relations, ethnic politics seems to exert a substantial threat as a highly 
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relevant variable that has been ignored. Liberal theory of IR “opens the black box of 
state” and views states as not unitary actors, but representatives of individuals, 
groups, and polities embedded within their domestic societies (Moravcsik 2003: 5). 
Therefore, ethnic politics inevitably becomes relational within the context of liberal 
theorisation, since ethnic groups may be influential domestic actors.  
Ethnic politics studies concentrating on the inter-state or international 
dimensions of ethnic conflict abound. Some of those studies explain the role of 
ethnic politics on state behaviour. However, ethnic politics is evidently “tended to be 
slighted, if not ignored” in mainstream IR theory, to borrow Moynihan‟s expression 
(1993: 27). Even liberal theory of IR, which aims to explain state behaviour with 
reference to domestic societal actors, does not take ethnic politics into account. This 
neglect in theory prevents ethnic politics studies to develop systematically upon an 
overarching central question of how ethnic politics affects state behaviour, which 
could make a stronger connection between ethnic politics and international relations. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 Studies of ethnic politics in IR emerged after decolonisation and made a 
genuine breakthrough during the post-Cold War era. Its boundaries as a subfield of 
IR have been quite permeable, deriving theoretical backgrounds from anthropology, 
sociology, political science, and even human psychology. Ethnic politics studies have 
not been systematically organised around a relational central question because of 
disorder and lack of interconnectedness within the field and neglect of ethnic politics 
within IR theory. However, ethnicity and ethnic politics remain significant factors 
that influence state behaviour and international politics as yet.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
 
 
 
 
“But no one can exactly predict what will happen tomorrow. The Soviet Union may 
dissolve, crumble away just like the Ottoman Empire or Austria-Hungary. The 
nations which it holds firmly in its hand may slip through its fingers.” 
 
- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, At the receptions of the 10th Anniversary of Republic, 29 
October 1933 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse the roles of ethnicity, ethnic politics, and ethnic 
mobilisations during the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in the Russian 
Federation. In the first part, the legacy of the Soviet nationalities policy is examined. 
It is argued that the Soviet nationalities policy and the Soviet leaders‟ failure to forge 
a unifying national identity have the greatest share in the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union along ethnic/national lines. In the second part, the place of the national/ethnic 
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movements in the dissolution of the Soviet Union is analysed. National/ethnic 
movements, it is argued, were not the main cause of the dissolution but they came to 
be the catalyst and decisive cause, as national/ethnic movements tend to become 
during times of crisis. In the third part, ethnic politics within the Russian Federation 
under Yeltsin‟s and Putin‟s rules are analysed. It is argued that ethnic politics was 
one of the most significant and influential issues on the agenda of both Yeltsin and 
Putin. 
 
3.2 The Soviet Legacy 
It is possible to argue that there is a tendency in both scholarly and political 
environments of international relations to perceive and treat the Russian Federation 
as a nation-state, as the short and common name Russia clearly exposes.  This 
tendency does apply with respect to the Soviet Union (Harmstone 1977: 74; Suny 
2001: 3), but not as strong as it does for the Russian Federation. The understanding 
of the Soviet Union in the scholarly perception, as Yuri Slezkine‟s famous article 
implies with its title The USSR as a Communal Apartment (1994), tended to 
incorporate the awareness of and the emphasis on the ethnic diversity and 
multinational structure of the Soviet Union, especially after mid-1970s (Suny 2001: 
6).  
There is also considerable scholarly agreement on the conclusion that 
although the Soviet nationalities policy had ultimately intended to replace ethnic 
identifications with class structure and communist ideology, it only strengthened 
ethnic particularism and nation-building processes and “succeeded only too well in 
creating the conditions for ultimate demise [of the Soviet Union]” (Suny 2007: 52).    
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However, a kind of unifying identity, or a quasi-national identity had been 
developed even if not deliberately intended. The construction of that identity came in 
the form of applying family metaphors to the people and thus creating a unifying 
identity based on family ties. This conception of identity with reference to family 
metaphors was not indeed an invention of the Bolsheviks, but it was a traditional 
practice developed during the Tsarist era. Tsar was seen as the father of his subjects, 
while the homeland was frequently referred as “mother Russia” (Tolz 2001: 4). The 
employment of family metaphors provided some sense of unity, since it invoked 
feelings of loyalty and sacrifice for the unity of the motherland that is represented by 
the concept of family itself.  
Further, the denomination “Soviet” was used as a quasi-national identity 
(Beissinger 2004: 53). Accordingly, homo sovieticus found a place as a quasi-
national identity of the Soviet Union in the minds of Western scholars and 
politicians. As certain authors contend (Sanborn 2002; Beissinger 2004: 50), these 
identifications can be seen as attempts to promote a nation-building project on the 
basis of civic ties. However, more than being unifying identities that can mobilise or 
consolidate people; they are expressions of a common way of life and of a lingua 
franca. 
Neither social upheavals nor nationalist and ethnic uprisings that started 
during the course of perestroika and glasnost were unprecedented in Russia. The 
Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the ensuing civil war provided the ethnic groups 
under the Tsarist rule an opportunity to mobilise under the banner of the right of self-
determination and to establish their own independent
4
 or autonomous states (Suny 
                                                     
4
 By the word „independence‟, intellectuals and politicians of some ethnic groups, such as Volga 
Tatars, did not refer to full-fledged secession from Russia. Their understanding was to enjoy the right 
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2006: 130-131). These ethnic groups enjoyed ephemeral independent statehood until 
1922 when the Bolsheviks ultimately settled their rule and order. Thereafter, they 
were incorporated into the Soviet Union with different levels of autonomy, ranging 
from union republic to no political status at all (Zisserman-Brodsky 2003: 22). 
Nationalist and ethnic mobilisations demonstrated that those insurgent ethnic groups 
in Russia were not mere ethnies, but they had developed an idea of nationalism in the 
modern sense.  
In the Soviet Union, especially starting with Stalin‟s rule, the absence of a 
common national identity was compensated with an omnipresence of ideology and 
“state-dominated socio-political structure” (Viola 1996: 11). This could be 
maintained through coercive mechanisms and repressions in many spheres of life 
including but not exclusive to ethnic identities (McLoughlin and McDermott 2003: 
6). Totalitarian rule and coercive policies did not go without reactions and rebellions. 
Economic policies, dekulakisation (liquidation of well-to-do peasants) and 
collectivisation under Stalin were carried out through coercive mechanisms; and they 
caused peasant resistances and revolts. However, these revolts did not turn into 
revolutionary movements because coercive mechanisms were further strengthened as 
a response to those revolts (Viola 1996: 234-235). The Soviet system clearly had 
serious economic, social, and ethnic problems which would not come to the forefront 
in a revolutionary manner until the coercive mechanisms highly diminish or cease to 
exist. This diminishing of coercive rule was not to happen until Gorbachev‟s reform 
programs.  
                                                                                                                                                      
of national self-determination within autonomy under the greater Russian rule. This issue is to be 
elaborated in detail in the next chapter.    
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3.2.1 Lenin Era 
 
 Classical Marxist theory, though incompatible in its nature with nationalism 
and ethnic differentiation, appreciated the salience of nationalism as an instrument in 
the course of the socialist revolution (Connor 1983: 7). Therefore, it managed to deal 
with nationalism by successfully contextualising national questions into its 
framework as “by-products of capitalism” (Connor 1983: 6). Lenin‟s understanding 
of socialism represented a transitory and evolutionary process; as he considered state 
capitalism a functional device in the transition to “full socialism” (Lenin 1983:24). 
Since “backward nations had not developed a differentiation of the proletariat from 
bourgeois elements” according to the Bolshevik understanding (Slezkine 1994: 421), 
the backwardness on the national or ethnic level stood as an impediment in front of 
this evolution.  
Therefore, according to Lenin‟s conception of socialism most of the 
nationalities of Russia could not be considered as genuine participants to the 
revolution.  Those nationalities along with others outside Russia were “destined to 
follow us [revolutionaries] on the stage of history in the near future” (Lenin 1966: 
610). Based on this reasoning, not only strengthening and but also inventing not-yet-
constructed ethnic identities and cultures became one of the basic underpinning 
elements of Lenin‟s policy. 
Along with this broader background, korenizatsiia (“indigenisation” or 
“nativisation”) (Payne 2001: 224) was instrumental for the indoctrination of 
socialism, since the adoption of Russian as lingua franca would mean “great nation 
chauvinism” (Lenin 1966: 606), which was seen as one of the greatest dangers by 
Lenin. “Great nation chauvinism” was also named “greater danger principle”, which 
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suggested that while all kinds of nationalisms are products of capitalism, defensive 
nationalism of smaller ethnic groups cannot be considered equal with offensive 
nationalism of the colonialist greater nation (Martin 2002: 70). Building upon this 
principle Lenin justified his nationalities policy, which supported the national, 
cultural and linguistic development of non-Russian ethnic groups while suppressing 
any kind of emphasis on Russianness or Russian nationalism.   
The juxtaposition of Lenin‟s understanding of ethnicity and nationalism 
between the constructivist and primordialism approaches is difficult. The 
understanding that ethnic identification and nationalism are by-products of capitalism 
implies a constructivist notion, suggesting that pre-capitalist societies do not have 
such identifications. However, Lenin‟s emphasis that ethnicity is a reality which 
cannot be externally overcome, and his ascription of ethnicity to the biology rather 
than culture (Beissinger 2004: 52), overlaps with primordialism.   
 
3.2.2 Stalin Era 
 
During Lenin‟s rule, Stalin, as the Commissar of Nationalities, influenced 
Lenin‟s nationalities policy. It is generally accepted that Lenin‟s nationalities policy 
was consistently carried out by Stalin during his own rule (Payne 2001: 224). 
However, there are disagreements which stipulate that Stalin betrayed Lenin‟s 
ideology and his policies on the whole (Carr 1953: 1). Stalin‟s First Five-Year Plan 
(1928-1932) aimed at the economic and industrial development of backward 
nationalities (Blitstein 2001: 253).   
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Yet, Stalin‟s approach to the nationalities question differed from Lenin‟s 
understanding, at certain respects in implementation, if not in content. The tendency 
is to accept that, arguably in contrast with Lenin, Stalin was not ideologically driven 
in his policies, but he used ideology as a disguise and legitimate tool to exert stronger 
political control (Ree 2002: 1-2). Stalin‟s decision for standardisation of the 
obligatory Russian language education in non-Russian schools in 1937 (Blitstein 
2001: 255) is one of the indicators of the difference, although this did not necessarily 
imply Russification or Russian nationalism (Suny 2001: 12).  Furthermore, Stalin‟s 
great purges, mobilisation campaigns for World War II, deportations of nationalities, 
and mass repressions and necessarily imply a kind of Russification, though the main 
impulse in those policies were not nationalistic but rather they were for the purpose 
of consolidation of Stalin‟s totalitarian rule.   
Ultimately, either with purely idealistic urges or with a strategic concern 
(Connor 1983: 47-48), or with a combination of both, Lenin and Stalin had been 
sympathetic to and supportive of the right of national self-determination up to a 
certain extent. They even granted initially each and every nationality the right to 
secede and establish their own independent states during the revolution and civil war 
(Connor 1983: 45). The Soviet Union, as a result, had been designated along ethnic 
lines as a great confederation in which smaller federations of smaller ethnic groups 
were interbedded.  
The unity of the Soviet Union was based on a strong centralised authority and 
commitment to a common ideology. The ardent commitment to the ideology 
prevented Bolshevik leaders to attend the rising model of political organisation of the 
twentieth century, nation-state, which entailed forging a single nation from the 
peoples within the boundaries of the territories at hand. This process was generally 
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implemented through incorporating all different ethnic identities into the supra-
national identity of the great power.  A strong nation-making project in the Soviet 
Union became impossible because the greater danger principle necessarily ruled out 
any attempts to create a national identity based on Russianness, and because 
Marxism as the roots of the official ideology did not suggest that national identity 
would be a dominant feature of world politics. 
 
3.2.3 Khrushchev Era 
 
After Stalin‟s death, it became evident to the party leaders or to the 
presidium, and later to specifically Khrushchev, that relaxation of Stalin‟s 
mechanisms was urgently necessary to cope with the alarming problems of the 
system. However, the main question remained as “how far could any relaxation go 
without endangering the Soviet state” (Nove 1992: 118). Being aware of this fact and 
together with a concern on the maintenance of his rule, Khrushchev carried out his 
policy of de-Stalinisation and of relative liberalisation with control and caution 
(Benson 1990: 103). The main purpose of Khrushchev‟s reforms was to tackle the 
economic and social problems of Stalin‟s overcentralised state-command economy 
and to relieve the mass fear stemming from state terror and repressions under Stalin 
(Kulavig 2002: 156-157).  
Nevertheless, Khrushchev‟s liberal policy of nationalities was significant as 
preparatory conditions for national movements, both within the territories of the 
Soviet Union and in the Central and Eastern European communist states (Nove 1992: 
135-136). Khrushchev‟s rule and policies of de-Stalinisation gave the opportunity the 
people to voice their grievances; made uprisings in the labour camps (Kulavig 2002: 
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216) and mass unrests by workers possible (Kulavig 2002: 123). Having significant 
similarities with Gorbachev‟s reforms (Gorbachev 2000: 34; Tompson 1993: 77), 
society‟s reaction to Khrushchev‟s de-Stalinisation policy heralded the upcoming 
movements and upheavals when coercive means were both deliberately and 
inevitably relaxed by Gorbachev. 
 
3.2.4 Brezhnev Era 
 
Brezhnev‟s policies that led to “stagnation” (Gorbachev 2000: 48) or to 
“successful stabilisation” of the Soviet system (Bacon 2002: 10) prevented the 
explosion of ethnic and social discontents. Brezhnev‟s nationalities policy consisted 
of “merging” the Soviet nations under a single national identity through the 
principles of sliyanie (fusion), which included elements of corporatism (Bunce 1983: 
134) and ethnic equalisation (Fowkes 2002: 72). This policy resulted in a prevalent 
“domestic tranquillity” (Smith 2005: 12) and the empowerment of the leaders of the 
union republics (Smith 2005: 18).  
Either as a result of Brezhnev‟s nationalities policy or of his stabilisation 
policy, ethnic conflicts were still of lesser significance among all kinds of unrests in 
the Soviet Union (Fowkes 2002: 75). A comparison among the Soviet leaders, 
specifically between Khrushchev and Brezhnev, reveals the fact that under repressive 
rules ethnic factors do not generally initiate times of crisis in the first place, but they 
tend to dominate all other factors during the course of the crisis.  
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3.3 Dissolution of the Soviet Union 
As it was analysed previously, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had 
tremendously influential implications not only for international politics but also for 
the International Relations discipline. The dissolution of the Soviet Union along 
national/ethnic lines and through ethnic/national mobilisations is one of the reasons 
that make its implications groundbreaking.  
Explanations accounting for the dissolution abound. Although various 
different explanations can be provided for the underlying reasons that brought the 
end of the Soviet system; the ultimate, or the prominent, cause of the dissolution 
necessarily stems from the ethnic structure of the Soviet Union (Smith 2005: 19; 
Beissinger 2004: 160). It is argued here that although national and ethnic 
mobilisations were not the initiating cause of the dissolution, their rising dominance 
during the course of events made the ethnic structure of the Soviet Union turn out to 
be one of the most significant causes.   
 
3.3.1 Gorbachev Era 
 
Gorbachev‟s reform programs of perestroika (construction), adopted in the 
twenty-seventh party congress in February 1986, and glasnost (transparency), 
emerged concurrently in early 1986
5
, have been revolutionary in the sense that they 
were designed to significantly change and impose a “new thinking” (Groth and 
Britton 1993: 628) on the traditional characteristics of Russia
6
. Those characteristics 
                                                     
5
 For a detailed chronology of late Gorbachev era, see Stephen Kotkin‟s Select Chronology in 
Steeltown, USSR: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era. 
6
 The denomination “Russia” is used to refer to both the Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Russia at the 
same time. 
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can be identified as “authoritarian politics, economic underdevelopment, and 
considerable power in the international system” (Bunce 1993: 107). The 
characterisation of Gorbachev‟s new thinking as revolutionary is not overstating its 
significance, since new ideas aimed at designing the future and discrediting the past 
are among triggering causes of revolutions (Almond 1996: 15). This characterisation 
makes Gorbachev‟s new thinking an initiator of a time of crisis, which is generally 
caused by wars and revolutions. The tides of nationalism and ethnic mobilisations 
that seem as pointless efforts under strong coercive rules (Beissinger 2004: 54) are 
encouraged during times of crisis. However, their character of threatening the very 
existence of the state, either an empire or a nation-state, supplants the initiating 
dimensions of the crisis and leads to the alterations of the crisis into national and 
ethnic uprisings. 
When Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, a number of chronic economic 
problems of the Soviet system, especially stagnation, climaxed. The need for reform 
appeared to be urgent rather than revolutionary (Kotz 1997: 54-55). Gorbachev 
initially thought of his reform programs as a continuation of the October Revolution 
and as attempts for the realisation of certain fundamental ideas. These ideas were 
overcoming repression, regulating bureaucracy, implanting democracy, and 
settlement of economic failure (Gorbachev 2000: 56). Later, however, he concluded 
that these challenges were only the tip of the iceberg; and that the problems of the 
Soviet Union stemmed from the very foundations of the system itself, specifically its 
totalitarian character, overall inertia, and ineffective economic and political structure.  
Therefore, Gorbachev contended the necessity of a revolutionary change, 
which entailed a shift to a “democratic political system and social market economy” 
(Gorbachev 2000: 56). In line with the conclusion above, Gorbachev did not consider 
 33 
 
the nationalities question as alarming as economic failure or the absence of 
democracy. Therefore, the nationalities question did not have a place in the raison 
d'être of Gorbachev‟s reform programs. Similarly, the popular fronts initially 
emerged for the purpose of providing support for perestroika. However, they later 
began to protest perestroika and became centres of national mobilisation (Beissenger 
2004: 170). The very initial protests that enjoyed the opportunity provided by 
glasnost emerged against environmental problems in Kazakhstan and Baltic states. 
However, they quite easily turned into national mobilisations (Smith 2005: 73). 
Streams of protests started as against systemic failures of Soviet state, specifically 
economic failures that had resulted in shortages of main supplies and in social 
problems of most prominently workers. However, within a short period of time the 
“master frame” became the “anti-imperial secessionist frame” (Beissinger 2004: 
159).  
 
3.3.2 The Parade of Sovereignties 
 
Kazakhs had been the earliest in nationalist mobilisation against the Soviet 
Union. In 1986, Gorbachev replaced Dinmukhamed Kunayev, the First Secretary of 
Kazakh Communist Party and an ethnic Kazakh, with an ethnic Chuvash Gennady 
Kolbin. In December 1986, Kazakhs protested the dismissal in Alma-Ata. The 
protests are known as Jeltoqsan (in Kazakh “December”) Riot, and considered as one 
of the “major nationalist crack” in the Soviet system (Cummings 2002: 60).  
The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania followed the Kazakhs in 
the manner of nationalist mobilisation (Beissinger 2004: 166). Another prominent 
ethnic/national mobilisation emerged among Armenians, once one of the ethnic 
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groups most loyal the centre (Beissinger 2004: 186). They raised their demands 
under glasnost to Gorbachev, and asked for a settlement under perestroika over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue in late 1987 (Abrahamian 2001: 117). Crimean Tatars, one 
of the ethnic groups that was subjected to mass deportation under Stalin, organised 
mass protests in Red Square in summer 1987 demanding complete return to their 
homeland (Uehling 2004: 167). In late 1987 and early 1988, Ukrainians and 
Georgians were mobilised with separatist demands (Smith 2005: 74).  
The tide of national and ethnic mobilisation, therefore, had become the 
dominant character of the times of crisis which followed Gorbachev‟s reforms. 
Almost within all ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, whether with an autonomous 
union republic or not, nationalist movements came into existence when the Soviet 
Union formally dissolved on December 31, 1991.       
These instances help to demonstrate why national mobilisation and ethnic 
identity had been one of the ultimate, though not initiating, cause of the dissolution. 
Had the Soviet Union been a unified state in terms of its national identity, streams of 
protests might have led to overall reforms, a revolution or a regime change, but they 
could not find a way to turn out to be a threat to the very existence and integrity of 
the state. Without the legitimacy provided by the principle of self-determination, 
social and economic grievances cannot possibly lead to the dissolution or demise of a 
state; since people‟s tie to the state would be preserved on the basis of national 
identity. Mark Beissinger concluded his analysis pointing out that “by the end of 
1990, no one needed the centre in any form” (2004: 94). It is possible to argue that, 
given the economic and political failures of the Soviet system, the only form in 
which people could need the centre was a common national identity, which had not 
been built during the course of the Soviet Union.  
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3.4 Yeltsin Era: 1991-2000 
The radically idealist ideology of creating an overall changed society that was 
adopted by Lenin and Stalin had incrementally been challenged by the Soviet leaders 
after Stalin, from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. With Gorbachev, this trend of de-
Stalinisation and change became a revolutionary project, which ultimately led to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation officially declared itself as 
the successor of the Soviet Union in international affairs and accordingly recognized 
by the United Nations. Although Yeltsin was ideologically and politically antagonist 
to Gorbachev, he was committed to the principles of change that were identified with 
perestroika (Breslauer 2002: 12). Accordingly, to the new Russian Federation 
Yeltsin applied policies similar to perestroika.  
 
3.4.1 Nation-Building in Yeltsin’s Russia 
 
The end of the Soviet system did not mean a settlement of ethnic conflicts 
through dissolution and emergence of new states. On the contrary, it brought the 
ramifications of ethnic problems which had been dormant under the strong Soviet 
authority to the forefront. The newly founded Russian Federation experienced a more 
strongly rising “ethnic revival” (Treisman 1997: 212), which began with the 
perestroika. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, therefore, it had become a 
significant and widespread question whether the Russian Federation would dissolve 
in a similar vein (Payin 1995: 185; Hale 2005: 55; Latter 1994: 2; Smith 1999).  
As argued in the first section, Soviet leaders failed to construct a strong 
national identity - neither an ethnic one nor a civic one. Therefore, given that the 
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Soviet Union dissolved along national/ethnic lines, the Russian Federation, also a 
multinational state, was left with the challenge of defining its national identity and 
thus of initiating a nation-building process. This was one of the most significant, if 
not overtly alarming, tasks for the future of the new Russia that Yeltsin had to deal 
with during the first decade of the Russian Federation (Tolz 2004: 178).  
However, Yeltsin seemed to have no concrete theory or vision which he 
envisaged as the model for nation-building in the Russian Federation (Kremenyuk 
1994: xii). For that matter, the new Russian Federation operated under the defunct 
Soviet Constitution and federal treaty until 1993 (Chenoy 1999: 85).  
That was because, firstly, the major preoccupation of Yeltsin‟s Russia was 
state-building or “state-restoration” (Kagarlitsky 2002: 3), rather than “nation-
building”. The most imminent challenges, accordingly, came as such: The obscurity 
of the legitimacy of the Yeltsin‟s rule (Billington 2004: 43), full transition of the 
system from communism to market economy, tension between the Soviet authorities 
and the emerging Russian Federation (attempted coup of August 1991), and political 
crisis stemming from the discord among the branches of the separation of political 
power (1993 Constitution crisis) (McFaul1997: 6).  
Secondly, Russian Federation emerged as the first political entity which has 
come closest to a nation-state in Russian history (Billington 2004: 2). It was, after all, 
the “core ethnic region” of the Soviet Union (Hale 2005: 58). In contrast to the 
Soviet Union, the Russian Federation had no “core ethnic region”, no “Russian” 
federative unit in itself. Instead, ethnic Russian population, which constituted 81.5 
per cent according to 1989 Census of Nationality (Shaw 1999: 61), was predominant 
and scattered all across the country. Along with this fact, it was left with the Soviet 
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legacy that failed to provide a sound answer to the question of Russian national 
identity (Chafetz 1996-1997: 671).  
Nevertheless, issues of nation-building and nationalism, as a part of “state-
restoration” process, also had their own peculiar place in Yeltsin‟s policies. 
Therefore, the influence of ethnic politics in the course of Yeltsin‟s presidency was a 
significant instance of the modus vivendi of ethnic politics. Ethnic politics is as 
influential as the significance of threats it poses to state survival. When ethnic 
politics carries notions of either potential or actual separatism and threatens the 
integrity of the state, it elevates to the top on the agenda, even becomes the main 
issue, and trivialize all other struggles and ambitions; since survival precedes and 
conquers all other national interests (Waltz 1997: 913).         
During 1991 and 1992, while Yeltsin was still struggling to establish his rule, 
unionists, those who were defining Russia in the imperial sense and defending the 
revival of the Soviet Union, were prevalent in the Russian Federation and influential 
on Yeltsin (Kaushik 1999: 4). They were represented by the opposition coalition 
named “National Patriotic Forces” led by Gennady Zyuganov and supported by 
influential politicians such as Nikolai Ryzhkov and Alexander Rutskoi (Medish 
1997: viii). With very diverse impulses, envisagements, and ideologies at their 
background, what was in common for the all the unionists was that they defined 
Russian national identity geographically, above either ethnic or civic connotations, 
and discredited the prospects for designing the new Russia as a nation-state. Among 
the unionist there were communists, nationalists, and also some moderates in 
Yeltsin‟s circle such as Sergei Karaganov and Oleg Kiselev (Tolz 2004: 161).  The 
influence of the unionists on Yeltsin can be observed in Yeltsin‟s policies toward the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States, which were aimed at preserving Russia‟s ties 
with the former Soviet republics (Sakwa and Webber 1999: 381).  
After 1992, unionist views began to shrink into insignificance in terms of 
their influence on Russian politics and Yeltsin; and the views that contend a nation-
state model for Russia became more influential (Tolz 2004: 162).  Defenders of the 
nation-state framework were liberals, among who were Yeltsin himself and most of 
his allies - most prominently Grigory Yavlinsky and Andrei Kozyrev. They put a 
highly slighted emphasis on the concept of nationness and national identity of the 
Russian Federation. As a characteristic of liberal theory, they did not ascribe much 
significance to the matters of national identity. Rather, their affiliation with and 
support for the nation-state framework only stemmed from their commitment to 
Western values and thus identification of Russia with Western type of democratic, 
neoliberal, Westphalian nation-state (Chafetz 1996-1997: 672).  
A middle ground was occupied by the statists, who are most prominently 
represented by Victor Chernomyrdin and Alexander Lebed. These statists were 
defending a slower and state-controlled transition to market economy and proposing 
“a more Slavophilic conception of Russian identity” (Chafetz 1996-1997: 672-673). 
Among these three lines of main political groups in the new Russian 
Federation, Yeltsin‟s nation-building and nationalities policies were decisively 
determined by the liberal view, although each view had its own lesser influence 
(Kaushik 1999: 16). The incompetence, and even at times indifference, of this 
Russian liberal view in the issues of nation-building and nationalities could only 
avoid and keep at bay the disintegration of the Russian Federation, rather than 
providing a decisive solution and a consistent policy to the question of the post-
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Soviet Russian national identity (Chenoy 1999: 85).  As a result, ethnic politics and 
ethnic conflicts came to the forefront as the most serious threats to the survival of the 
Russian Federation under Yeltsin‟s rule.  
 
3.4.2 Ethnic Politics and Ethnic Conflicts under Yeltsin’s Rule 
 
 During 1990 and 1991, while the “parade of sovereignties” took the Soviet 
Union by the storm, not only the union republics of the USSR but also most 
autonomous republics within RSFSR, not least Chechnya, Ingushetia
7
, Tyva, 
Tatarstan, and Bashkiria, declared either complete independence or sovereignty 
(Melvin 1994: 2). It is important to note that not only autonomous ethnic republics 
but also a considerable number of regional federative subjects of RSFSR declared 
sovereignty. However, the movements of ethnic republics had been significant and 
formative in Russian politics, whereas regional movements proved to be ephemeral.  
 Since a new constitution for the Russian Federation was not legislated until 
1993 and a new federal treaty not proposed until 1992, the parade of sovereignties 
continued. Certain autonomous republics in the Federation had gone through plans 
and calculations of increasing their power and sovereignty in different levels. These 
plans ranged from declaration of complete independence as Chechnya did to 
demanding only economic autonomy as Sakha (Yakutia) went for (Kempton 1996: 
591). The most important national/ethnic movements in the newly independent 
Russian Federation emerged in Northern Caucasus and in Volga, initiated by 
Chechnya and Tatarstan.  
                                                     
7
 The Chechen and Ingush peoples had a single associate republic - Chechen-Ingush ASSR - under 
Soviet rule. 
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In October 1991, while the Soviet Union was officially still not dissolved, the 
self-proclaimed National Congress of Chechen People under the leadership of 
Dzhokhar Dudayev seized power in Chechnya and held parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Gorbachev remained totally ineffective in pursuing any kind of 
policy towards this declaration of sovereignty. Yeltsin, on the other hand, was 
alarmed. He declared state of emergency in Chechnya and send interior ministry 
troops (Evangelista 2002: 19). Thereupon, Dudayev began to form paramilitary 
forces and also to arm ordinary Chechen people.  
The Chechen problem remained hung in the air until November 1994, when 
Yeltsin issued the decree for the use of military force in Chechnya, since the travails 
of “state-restoration” and Yeltsin‟s fight for power preoccupied Yeltsin‟s agenda.  It 
was only after Yeltsin had the new constitution ratified in 1993 and entrusted himself 
with vast powers that could not be limited by checks and balances; he initiated the 
military intervention in Chechnya in December 1994. Indecisive military operations 
and fighting continued for two years. Dudayev was killed in April 1996. Russian 
army fought Chechen paramilitary forces until August 1996, when an ambiguous 
treaty between Moscow and Chechnya was signed. The withdrawal of troops and 
ending of the intervention, which was far from being a success story for Yeltsin, was 
mostly due to his concerns for the upcoming presidential elections.       
Yeltsin‟s policies towards Chechnya represent an appropriate instance of his 
and his ministers‟ and advisors‟ lack of a concrete and consistent nationalities and 
nation-building project. Yeltsin followed, or seemed to follow, a policy which 
underestimated and partly remained indifferent to this serious threat until 1994. He 
was unequivocally refusing to negotiate with Dudayev (Evangelista 2002: 23) and 
supporting a solution through force. However, at the same time, he failed to launch a 
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successful and decisive military operation.  Neither the initiation nor the termination 
of the military operations was planned accordingly with military and strategic 
considerations. During the whole course of the Chechen problem, Yeltsin‟s drive was 
protecting and maintaining his own power in domestic politics rather than providing 
a policy that would stabilize the relations between centre and the periphery and avoid 
ethnic conflicts in the Federation.   
Tatarstan declared sovereignty in August 1990 and Mintimer Shaimiev was 
elected president in 1991. Shaimiev refused to sign the federal treaty proposed by 
Yeltsin in March 1992, being one of the two federal subjects to refuse, on the basis 
that the treaty did not envisage enough authority and sovereignty for Tatarstan. 
Shaimiev, the local communist party leader during the Soviet era, was a moderate 
politician who did not speak of either full secession from the Federation or resorting 
paramilitary fighting for guaranteeing his terms. There were also nationalist Tatar 
politicians and activists who were in favour of full-fledged independence as the 
union republics of the USSR, especially Turkic republics, gained after the 
dissolution. The nationalist activism in Tatarstan had been already developed by the 
end of 1980s (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003: 144).  
The idea of the unity of fate with the other Turkic peoples has been the main 
drive in Tatarstan‟s search for a greater sovereignty or full independence. That is 
firstly because Volga Tatars have been the pioneers of the Turkic enlightenment and 
nationalism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Secondly, the 
geographical closeness of Volga Tatars with the Central Asian Turkic peoples, 
especially with Kazakhstan, rendered the ties between those peoples significant in 
terms of their security concerns vis-a-vis Russians (Karasar and KuĢkumbayev 2009: 
49). 
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Accordingly, in late summer 1992, Shaimiev arranged a tripartite meeting 
with presidents of Bashkiria and Kazakhstan - Murtaza Rakhimov and Nursultan 
Nazarbayev - in search for the support of other Turkic peoples in the former Soviet 
Union (Kremenyuk 1994: 30). Tatarstan‟s search for greater sovereignty, unlike 
Chechnya, did not escalate into violent conflict. Shaimiev signed a special federal 
treaty with Moscow in 1994 and settled its demands mostly in favour of Tatarstan‟s 
terms; granting “even confederate relations” (Hann 2003: 344) between Kazan and 
Moscow.   
Yeltsin‟s policy towards Tatarstan was diametrically different from the policy 
he pursued towards Chechnya. Yeltsin‟s initial standing concerning the “parade of 
sovereignties”, which he used as a trump card against Gorbachev and which is 
famously summarized in his words, declared while on a visit to Kazan in 1990, as 
“take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” (Kahn 2002: 282), did not change 
with respect to Tatarstan, unlike with respect to Chechnya. While Yeltsin 
consistently refused to negotiate with Dudayev, he was comfortable with Tatar 
demands, which were not indeed lesser than Chechen demands in content. Moreover, 
Tatarstan was often seen and exemplified as a benign alternative of sovereignty in 
contrast to Chechnya (Evangelista 2002: 96).  
Beyond any doubt, Yeltsin‟s two contradistinctive attitudes towards Tatarstan 
and Chechnya cannot be explained firstly without the historical background of the 
relations between these two peoples and Russia. The images of Tatar and Caucasian 
in the minds of Russian rulers are in many ways different.  Secondly, the resort to 
force and violence by Chechen nationalists was certainly decisive in shaping 
Yeltsin‟s policies. However, ultimately, it can be deduced that Yeltsin‟s policy on 
nationalities and nation-building in Russia was based on short-term calculations, if 
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they were not totally spontaneous and haphazard. Acting Prime Minister Yegor 
Gaidar‟s strategy of economic transition, summarized in his words as “we must 
simply shut our eyes tightly and leap into the unknown” (Medvedev 2000: 14), 
seemed to also characterize Yeltsin‟s nationalities policy.  
Ethnic politics and ethnic conflicts, therefore, determined the course of 
Yeltsin‟s policies and end of his presidency. Given that Yeltsin left Russia within 
only six years with an unsuccessful war against one of its own federal subject, 
critical concessions to many other federal subjects, and an undefined, let alone 
unified, national identity for the Federation; Vladimir Putin‟s rise, to quote Norman 
Stone‟s conclusion on the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, “was a fact before it 
happened”. (1998: 301) 
 
3.5 Putin Era: 2000-2008 
 On the night of December 31, 1999, at the turn of the millennium, Yeltsin 
voluntarily and prematurely resigned and entrusted presidency provisionally until the 
upcoming elections in March 2000 to Vladimir Putin, who had been in office as the 
prime minister since August 1999. At the time, Putin was largely unknown to both 
the populace and to the elites. However, he made an astonishing breakthrough in a 
short span of time and elected president in March 2000 in the first round by sweeping 
over the runner-up Zyuganov.    
 The Putin era has been a unique and new chapter for Russia, especially in 
regard to its breaking the infinite loop of so-called “Russia‟s search for itself” and of 
constant state of emergency, revolution, and dramatic vicissitudes. In most spheres of 
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Russian politics the ambiguity and haphazardness, bequeathed especially by Yeltsin, 
was either practically settled or approached with a concrete policy. Among certain 
others, the issues of Russian national identity, nationalities, federalism, and ethnic 
politics had been significantly central to Putin‟s policies. 
 
3.5.1 The Revision of the Federal Arrangements 
 
 Early in his presidency Putin strongly emphasized that he did not want Russia 
to have an official ideology and supported ideological pluralism. He considered 
revolutionary change as detrimental and pointless (Sakwa 2008: 46), and favoured 
executing changes and transformations in “normality and normalization” (Sakwa 
2008: 43). It is clear that Putin believed in the power of practice and execution while 
discrediting ideological and theoretical efforts as dysfunctional. Therefore, he is not a 
fit for traditional ideological camps of Slavophiles, Westernisers, and Eurasianists; 
he was eclectic and practical. However, he can be best identified with statism, which 
had been defended as a middle ground during Yeltsin era by Victor Chernomyrdin 
and Alexander Lebed.  As a statist, Putin attached importance to strengthening the 
central authority above anything else. This notion first and foremost entailed a 
reformation of the federal system (Petrov 2002: 73). 
 Yeltsin‟s rule left Russia as an “asymmetrical federation” (Starovoitova 1995: 
138) and with a “segmented regionalism” (Sakwa 2008: 194), in which relations 
between the centre and the federative subjects are arranged through special bilateral 
power-sharing treaties. This type of a federative system led to strengthening of the 
autonomy of the federal subjects, especially the autonomous ethnic republics, and to 
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a cumbersome bureaucratic and governmental system. Further, and arguably most 
importantly, this asymmetrical federation precluded the nation-building process and 
threatened the very integrity of the state.  
 Putin‟s new federalism policy was not an ad hoc and spontaneous 
arrangement. In 1998, while Putin was First Deputy Chief of Presidential Staff for 
Regions, he was appointed as the head of the commission for power-sharing treaties 
with the federal subjects, replacing Sergei Shakhrai. Putin did not sign one single 
additional treaty, while during Shakhrai‟s incumbency 42 treaties were signed. When 
Putin was appointed as the head of FSB, he initiated the project “The Law on 
Regions”, which would redefine federal relations (Sakwa 2008: 189).  
 Only after two months Putin was elected president, in May 2000, he issued a 
presidential decree dividing Russia into seven administrative districts as larger super-
regions overriding eighty-nine federative regions (Petrov and Slider 2005: 243). The 
governors of the new seven federal districts, polpredy (plenipotentiary governors), 
were to be appointed directly by the president. Polpredy were granted authorization 
for overseeing the realization of changes in regional constitutions sanctioned by 
Putin on the basis that they were contradictory to the Constitution. Therefore, the 
forming of the new federal districts ended the horizontal power-sharing between the 
federal centre and its subjects; established a power vertical, and undermined the 
sovereignty of the federative regions.  
Simultaneously, Putin, within his policy of new federalism, revised the 
structure of the Federation Council, the upper house of the bicameral Federal 
Assembly of Russia. The Federation Council formally had significant powers granted 
by the constitution, including approving or rejecting the legislations made by the 
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State Duma (Remington 2003: 669).  According to the 1993 Constitution and 1995 
amendment, the first two leaders, one executive and one legislative, of federal 
subjects were to be directly the members of the Federation Council. In May 2000, 
Putin applied a new law which stipulated that the leaders of the federal subjects 
would not be the members, but they were to appoint two representatives in the 
Federation Council as members. This law curtailed the power of regional leaders 
(Remington 2003: 671) and took away their parliamentary immunity (Petrov and 
Slider 2005: 243). Further, in June 2000, the Constitutional Court declared the 
sovereignty declarations of the federal subjects illegal; and the bilateral power-
sharing treaties were either amended or removed by not renewing the expiring ones 
(Sakwa 2008: 200). 
 Along with all these rearrangements, Putin‟s most significant new federalism 
reform was the change in the accession of regional leaders. Officially since 1996, 
regional leaders had been taking office through elections. In September 2003, Putin 
declared that the candidates for presidential elections in the federal regions were to 
be nominated by the president of the Russian Federation. This reform was an 
indicator that Putin was undertaking a strong re-centralization and nation-building, 
which would evade federalism and reduce the federal authorities to nothing more 
than ordinary state bureaucrats.  
 These reforms of new federalism, especially the nomination of regional 
presidential candidates, were met by protests and criticism on the part of the 
presidents of the national republics, especially of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
(RFE/RL 2004: Tatar President Criticizes Putin Reform Plans). Reforms were also 
criticized by public protests and demonstrations (Gorenburg 2004: 3). However, 
Putin managed the process successfully through by appeasing the presidents of 
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Tatarstan and Bashkortostan by nominating them for new additional terms. Although 
nationalists in those republics saw reforms as unacceptable, as presidents, too, 
initially did; in time the presidents came to comply with them. Shaimiev, once an 
ardent critic of the reforms, admitted that he suddenly changed his approach to 
reforms, by thinking that it is quite natural for the president of Russian Federation to 
try to consolidate his own power as it is natural for the president of Tatarstan to 
consolidate his in Tatarstan (Tatar.ru 2003: Statements and Interviews ) . Further, 
Putin could easily justify the reforms with reference to separatist acts of Chechen 
separatists (Goode 2007: 366). 
 
3.5.2 Chechnya Revisited 
 
 In August 1999, the Chechen separatists led by Shamil Basaev attacked and 
invaded a village in Dagestan. Putin, who was appointed acting prime minister only 
few days after the attacks, saw bringing a final and decisive solution for the problem 
of Chechen separatism as his “historical mission” (Evangelista 2002: 65). Putin 
immediately launched a military campaign in response to the attacks in Dagestan. 
Serious fighting in battle formation continued until 2001, leaving behind 12,000 
casualties in Russian military (around 3,000 killed and 9,000 wounded), many more 
casualties with statistics unavailable on the Chechen side, and around 100,000 
refugees (Tishkov 2004: xvii). The “second war in Chechnya” ended with the victory 
of Russian military, which conducted a more successful campaign in comparison to 
the “first war” (Stone 2006: 246). In June 2000, Putin secured an interim civilian 
government in Chechnya and appointed Akhmad-Hadji Kadyrov as the head of 
government (Evangelista 2002: 85).  
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However, Chechen separatism, temporarily defeated as a national force, was 
evolved into a jihadist insurgency, being supported by international jihadist 
networks. Jihadist schools mushroomed in Chechnya, giving more and more 
graduates; and jihadist commanders from the Middle East and Afghanistan poured in 
Chechnya and to North Caucasus (Bodansky 2007: 117). Al Queda‟s 9/11 terrorist 
attacks strengthened Putin‟s hand in his war against Chechen separatism; since both 
international and domestic criticisms were to a large extent silenced after 9/11. 
However, formidable terrorist attacks, most prominently Moscow theatre hostage 
crisis in 2002 and Beslan school siege in 2004 put Putin in a difficult position. A 
general perception became prevalent in 2005 that “Russia under Putin was 
backsliding into chaos and authoritarianism” (Sakwa 2008: 63). After 2006, 
however, the separatist insurgency began to evaporate and terrorist activity became 
loosely scattered to broader regions in Northern Caucasus.  
It is misleading to attribute Putin‟s war in Chechnya and his federal reforms, 
which are in many respects related with Chechen separatism, to traditional Russian 
imperialism or to Putin‟s statism/authoritarianism. Such kind of approaches cannot 
avoid providing easy, unsophisticated, and pseudo-conspiracy theory explanations. 
Putin‟s war in Chechnya and his federal reforms can be better explained from the 
point of view of the significance of ethnic politics in international relations. Putin‟s 
war and reforms were driven by the fear of dissolution, which could be easily 
initiated by a successful secession of one of the federal subjects - Chechnya.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 Both the formation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had been 
remarkable cases proving the significance of ethnic politics. Although ethnic politics 
seemed to languish in the face of the Cold War in international politics and of the 
systemic problems within the Soviet Union; it characteristically exploded as the 
Soviet system ceased to work functionally. Thereby, ethnic politics precipitated, if 
not caused, the way in which the Soviet Union was disintegrated. The strength of 
ethnic politics during the dissolution puts the nationalities/ethnic groups who carried 
out their own politics to a significant position. Among them, Volga Tatars, through 
their whole relations with Russians in different phases of history, present a very 
prominent case of national resilience and ethnic politics. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 THE VOLGA TATARS: NATIONAL RESILIENCE THROUGH TSARIST, 
SOVIET, AND POST-SOVIET ERAS 
 
 
“I trust to be able to convince you that Kazan, the supposed miserable semi-Tartar, 
semi-Russian hamlet, of which you know but the name, and which you consider 
unworthy of a moment‟s attention, [...] possesses nevertheless certain rare and 
extraordinary elements, which give it a claim to the historian, the antiquarian, the 
artist, and the author.” 
- Edward Tracy Turnerelli, Kazan: The Ancient Capital of the Tartar Khans (1854) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse the historical and contemporary positions of the 
Volga Tatars during the Tsarist and Soviet eras with reference to their national 
resilience/consciousness. In the first part, the Muscovite conquest of Kazan and its 
great impact on Tatar national identity is examined. In the second part, a detailed 
account of the national movements among Volga Tatars is provided. In the third part, 
the course of the national movements of Volga Tatars in the chaotic environment of 
the war and revolution is analysed. The fourth part focuses on the national 
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communism of Sultangaliev, the establishment of an autonomous Soviet Tatarstan, 
and the national identity of Volga Tatars under the Soviet rule. The ethnic politics 
performed by Volga Tatars is one of the prominent instances of the significance of 
ethnicity in international and domestic politics throughout the different stages of 
history. 
 
4.2 The Muscovite Conquest of Kazan and Volga Tatars under the Tsarist Rule 
The Volga Tatars
8
 have experienced many distinctive epochs of different 
political organizations, either as founders or as subjects, throughout their history. 
Until the Genghisid invasion of the Kipchak steppe, a storming conquest of the lands 
ranging roughly from Central Asia to Central Europe, the ancestors of the Volga 
Tatars, named as Bulgars, had kept their own state. The Bulgar State was established 
in the Volga basin around the city of Bulgar, and maintained its unique civilization 
from ninth to mid-thirteenth century (Rorlich 1986: 16; Zimonyi 1990: 183). After 
the Genghisid conquest (1215), the ethnonym “Tatar” had began to be used for all 
Turkic/Muslim peoples in the region, among which the Mongolic tribes were 
incorporated and assimilated. Initially subjects and one of the targets of the invasion, 
Tatars became in time the khans and the ruling elites of the Golden Horde, an empire 
established by Mongols, incorporating mainly Turkic and Slavic elements as its 
subjects. 
                                                     
8
 There are several possible denominations for Volga Tatars. “Itil (or Idel) Tatars” is indeed the 
authentically correct version, since Volga is called Itil in Tatar language. However, “Volga Tatar” is 
widely used in the literature. “Kazan Tatar” is another denomination that is widely used. However, it 
has a connotation that limits this nationality within the city of Kazan. Although Kazan is the 
heartland, Tatars are widely spread densely along the middle and lower Volga and loosely all over 
Eurasia. For these reasons, the denomination “Volga Tatar” is preferred. In places, simply “Tatar” is 
used.     
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The Kazan Khanate (1437-1552) was the main successor state to the Golden 
Horde (Altın Orda), which was divided along several khanates in the first half of the 
fifteenth century: Astrakhan Khanate, Crimean Khanate, and Sibir Khanate. The 
provinces of Kazan and Astrakhan were named as the “Great Country” (Uluğ Yurt) 
by the khans of Golden Horde. The Grand Duchy of Muscovy, as a Russian 
knyazhestvo (principality), was paying tribute to the Khan of Golden Horde, whose 
house was based in the city of Saray in the lower Volga. It was by the courtesy of the 
tribute that Duchy of Muscovy was given the title “grand” by the Khan of the Golden 
Horde (Ġnalcık 2008: 47). The Grand Duchy of Muscovy continued to pay taxes to 
the successor states; however, not as regularly and accurately as to the Golden 
Horde. That was because the successor khanates were fighting a “cold war” of 
political influence after the dissolution of the Golden Horde. Kasım as one of the 
sons of the first khan of the Kazan Khanate Uluğ Muhammed (Khudiakov 1991: 22), 
seceded from the Kazan Khanate by having the support of Muscovy and established 
his own little khanate, Kasım Khanate, in 1452. 
Further, the Crimean Khanate exerted a strong influence in the Kazan 
Khanate with the support of the Ottomans. The concern of the Ottomans was to 
curtail the expansion of Muscovy; but at the same time, it did not want the Crimean 
Khanate to gain too much political influence. Also, Kazan was not the primary 
concern of the Ottomans. However, for Muscovy, conquering Kazan and Astrakhan 
and expanding towards the East by annexing Volga was a matter of life and death, 
not only strategically but also psychologically. Muscovy, therefore, had already been 
harbouring serious plans of conquering Kazan before 1552 (Sevcenko 1967: 543). 
Consequently, Muscovy had a greater advantage to have more political influence in 
the Kazan Khanate and Ivan IV used the advantage successfully.    
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Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552 was, therefore, one of the greatest 
landmarks for both Russians and Volga Tatars - indeed, ultimately, of most of the 
Turkic/Muslim peoples. For Russia, the conquest was the “prelude to empire” 
(Huttenbach 1988: 45) before anything else. It had been a prelude in political, 
geographical, and cultural respects. For Volga Tatars, and indirectly for all 
Genghisid and earlier Asiatic inheritance in the Eurasian landmass, the conquest 
marked the end of their “Tatar yoke” over Muscovy. The fall of Kazan, therefore, 
changed the places of the suzerain and the subject and decisively reversed the 
balance of power.  
The Tatar-Russian relations that had diametrically changed with the conquest 
of Kazan retained two prominent aspects. The first, and at first sight the most 
important, aspect was the religious one; since it was a time when “religious identity 
was synonymous with political identity” (Huttenbach 1988: 55) and “relations 
between Russian and non-Russian had more of a religious than an ethnic bases” 
(quoted in Martin 1990: 31). Ivan IV saw his military expedition on Kazan as a 
means to convey “the True God to the unbelievers” (Rorlich 1986: 38). Therefore, 
the conquest was followed by an ardent campaign of converting Muslim Tatars into 
Orthodox Christianity.  
The measures of the missionary activity carried out by the Russians were 
mostly “punitive” and at times “conciliatory” (Rorlich 1986: 40). They were 
continued potently until the reign of Catherine II, when the “punitive” missionary 
activity stagnated and a more liberal policy towards Muslims was adopted (Devlet 
1991: 107). Starting with the reign of Catherine II (1762-1796), policies against 
Volga Tatars, such as that of Nikolai Il‟minskii (1822–1891), took a more 
sophisticated form by incorporating ethnographic and linguistic studies on Tatars. 
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Most of the earlier converted Tatars either soon after or after even centuries 
returned to Islam (Benningsen and Wimbush 1986: 11; Devlet 1985: 107). However, 
Tatars who were baptized during the course of the nineteenth century, Kiryashins 
(Krashens), sincerely embraced Orthodox Christianity and remained devoted to their 
new religion. They were granted with Russian names and with promised privileges, 
such as tax inducements (Lewis 1997: 215) and granted pomestia (hereditary 
holdings) (Martin 1990: 14), and considerably took their place within the Russian 
nobility. In time, they did not only harbour a new faith, but culturally and 
linguistically differentiated from the Muslim Tatars (Bayazitova 1997: 5). So that 
Kiryashins are considered as a separate ethnic group (Werth 2000: 498). However, 
on the whole, the efforts for converting Tatars into Orthodox Christianity found 
strong reaction on the Tatar side (Rorlich 2000: 39; Lewis 1997: 215), and became 
one of the most influential factors in the construction of Tatar national identity 
(Lazzerini 1981: 628).  
The Russian subjugation of Volga Tatars not only affected the formation of 
Tatar identity in a reactionary manner, but also in a progressive respect. The 
emergence and development of a reformist movement (Jadidism), initially in religion 
and education, later in culture and politics, is to a great extent engendered by the 
Russian enlightenment. Through the agency of an empire aspiring to elicit 
enlightenment from Europe, Volga Tatars had become “perhaps as much indebted to 
the French enlightenment as the Russians” (Rorlich 1986: 54). 
The second aspect was, on the other hand, the national/ethnic one. It is 
anachronistic to ascribe a national/ethnic consciousness to a medieval community 
unless one is not committed to primordialism as a theoretical framework. However, 
even with a constructivist point of view, it is possible to argue that a sense of 
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national/ethnic identity was ignited among the Volga Tatars. Such sense of identity 
took its roots from political and religious persecution but permeated to all other 
dimensions of life. Therefore, it created a sense of distinctiveness not only as 
Muslims but also as “Tatars” or “Kazanis” (Rorlich 1986: 3). 
The military conquest of Kazan and the Tatar resistance did not prove to be 
too challenging for Ivan IV and for his formidable power of forty pieces of artillery. 
What came to be the real resistance was after the conquest. Serious Tatar uprisings 
against the conquest continued until the end of the sixteenth century (DevletĢin 1981: 
9). Later, Tatars also participated in the uprisings of Stenka Razin (Rorlich 1986: 39) 
and Emelyan Pugachev (Roberts 2007: 154; Türkoğlu 2000: 75). However, Tatar 
resistance to Russian conquest had been more significant in the form of 
national/cultural/religious resilience than as an armed opposition. Religious 
education, which was deep-rooted and systematised since the times of Bulgar 
Khanate, had its peculiar and critical place in Tatar efforts for identity protection. 
Religious schools (medreses) were mushroomed in a way that they were established 
even in villages at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Bukharaev 2007: 103).  
By the means of preserving their educational, cultural, and religious 
traditions, Volga Tatars maintained their own communal identity; and therefore 
prepared a ground for a strong national consciousness to be gained in the beginning 
of the twentieth century. However, at the same time, they considered Russian culture, 
enlightenment and political rule as an inseparable chapter of their history. 
Characteristically, “although they believed in adopting themselves to the Russian 
culture to live in this world, they did not want to share the same afterlife with the 
Russians” (Türkoğlu 2000: 34). This peculiar, Janus-faced characteristic of Volga 
Tatars, which was developed after the fall of Kazan and consolidated with the 
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persecutions inflicted on them, was to be permanent and decisive throughout all 
stages of Tatar-Russian relations. It became strictly obvious when Tatars are 
compared with the other Muslim subjects of Russia, especially with the North 
Caucasians.  
 
4.3 Volga Tatars in the Late Tsarist Russia 
Tsarist Russia, as the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, had ruled 
over, either nominally or practically, a large spectrum of different ethnic groups. The 
first and only general systematic census in imperial Russia was carried out in 1897. 
The criterion for nationality in the census was language. Although this criterion does 
not accurately represent nationality (Cadiot 2005: 442), the census demonstrated that 
55.7 per cent of the population was non-Russian (Pipes 1954: 2).  
1905 Revolution had been a turning point for ideological and political 
consciousness among both Russians and non-Russians. The period of relative 
liberalisation and establishment of Duma paved way for greater political activity, 
thereby for national movements (Roshwald 2001: 27). However, the conception of 
“patrimonial state” remained as a centrepiece of Tsarist policy until the end of the 
empire (Roshwald 2001: 20). Therefore, intellectual and political developments 
began by the eighteenth century in Russia outdistanced the Tsarist policy. Richard 
Pipes summarises this discrepancy: 
The paradox - and tragedy - of Russian history in the last century of 
the ancien régime was the fact that while the government clung to the 
anachronistic notion of absolutism, the country itself was undergoing 
an extremely rapid economic, social, and intellectual evolution, which 
required a new, more flexible form of administration (1954: 7). 
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Tsarist policy tough lacked a sense of Russian nationalism, considered non-
Russian, specifically non-Slavic and non-Orthodox, ethnic groups as inorodotsy 
(aliens) who were exempted from nobility and military service (Slocum 1998: 173). 
This policy contributed to maintenance and development of the sense of 
distinctiveness on the part of especially Turkic/Muslim nationalities of the empire. 
Together with the flourishing intellectual and political consciousness after 1905, 
those nationalities found the opportunity to participate in political life by asserting 
their national causes. 
 
4.3.1 Jadidism: Reformism and Enlightenment among Volga Tatars 
 
The Volga Tatars, since the times of the Volga Bulgaria, were distinguished 
from most of the other Turkic peoples with their settled civilisation and 
accommodation to the Russian culture. As it was analysed in the previous part, 
having a settled civilisation entailed proficiency in trade, mediation between the 
Russians and the other Turkic/Muslim peoples of the empire, and a strong tradition 
of religious education. Tatar religious figures, almost as an unwritten rule, took 
religious education in the schools (medreses) in Bukhara and Samarkand, which 
were the centres of both classical religious education for Turkic peoples and of 
traditionalism/conservatism.  
The Volga Tatars, inevitably being less conservative because of the 
conditions of their civilisation and history, began to criticise the supposedly 
unquestionable verdicts of the religious ulama in Turkestan as early as the end of the 
seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries (Rorlich 1986: 49). 
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Ebunasır Kursavi (1726-1813) had been the initiator of this critical attitude towards 
traditional Islam after he returned from Turkestan to give religious education in 
Kazan. Kursavi‟s criticisms faced harsh reactions; but his critical attitude was 
adopted by his students, and represented most prominently by ġihabettin Mercani 
(1818-1889).    
Mercani, a religion-teacher and an imam in Kazan, adopted and verified 
Kursavi‟s criticisms (Rorlich 1986: 50) after he returned to Kazan from Bukhara and 
Samarkand in 1849. His views were revolutionary for the conditions of the time: he 
was arguing that learning Russian was not a sin at all and that jurisprudence in 
Islamic tradition was open to criticism and progress (Türkoğlu 2000: 51). Further, his 
reformism did not remain limited to religious issues. He is at the same time 
considered as the “father of modern Kazan Tatar historiography” (Schamiloglu 1990: 
39), with reference to his work examining Tatar history titled Müstefâdü’l Ahbâr fi 
Ahvâl-i Kazan ve Bulgar (Select Information on the Situation of Kazan and Bulgar) 
(Rorlich 1986: 51). Although the title is Arabic, Mercani wrote this work in Tatar 
language, as the first scholar to write Tatar history in native Tatar.  
Rızaeddin Fahreddin (1858-1936), who was initially kazi (Muslim judge) and 
then the mufti in Orenburg, was influenced by the works of Mercani and committed 
to the reformist ideas (Rorlich 1986: 54). Along with Kayyum Nasıri and Mercani, 
he had been one of the pioneers of reformism and of the national awakening of Volga 
Tatars (Taymas 1958: 1). Rızaeddin Fahreddin emphasised the academic deficiencies 
of religious education in medreses and the lack of philosophers such as Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Rousseau, and Kant in Islamic thought (Erul 2005: 70-71). He saw certain 
traditional religious books as “thieves stealing people‟s lives and times” (Türkoğlu 
2000: 35). 
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The reformism and enlightenment, namely Jadidism, of Volga Tatars were 
based on two pillars. The initial one, represented by Kursavi, Mercani, Nasıri, and 
Fahreddin, was the critical and reformist attitude towards traditional understanding 
and interpretation of Islam. The second pillar, intertwined with the first one, had 
been reform in education and the introduction of a “new method” (usul-ü cedit), 
which envisaged a new system of education (Pipes 1954: 14).   
The founder of the new method in education was Ismail Bey Gaspıralı, who 
was not a Volga Tatar, but a Crimean Tatar. His new method was as much the 
tangible fruition of the almost a century of Jadidist efforts of the Volga Tatar 
intellectuals as it was his own remarkable individual effort. Gaspıralı himself wrote 
textbooks for students, in a common Turkic language that he envisaged for all Turkic 
peoples. He simplified the Arabic script in a way that pupils could learn literacy 
within forty days. He tried to convince his people of the necessity of the education of 
girls (Seydahmet 1934).   
Gaspıralı‟s efforts went beyond education. He published the newspaper 
Tercüman (Perevodchik in Russian, literally Interpreter) in 1883 in the Crimea, at a 
time when Turkic peoples of Russia did not have any periodicals yet (Devlet 2004: 
51). The only exception was the short-lived Ekinci, the first periodical by Turkic 
peoples of the empire, which was published between 1875 and 1877 by Azerbaijani 
Hasan Bey Zerbabi in Baku (Jersild 1999: 504). Tercüman served as a means of 
creating political consciousness among Turkic and Muslim nationalities of Russia 
until 1914. It also aimed to create a Turkic lingua franca among those nationalities, 
each of which had already been speaking slightly different dialects. Gaspıralı‟s idea 
of a Turkic unity among the Turkic peoples of the empire had been one of the 
milestones of the national awakening of the Turkic peoples.  
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At the turn of the twentieth century, Jadidism had already been quickly 
embraced, developed and represented by the Volga Tatars (Schamiloglu 1990: 40-
41), who were, in Pipes‟ words, “culturally and economically, the most advanced 
Turks in Russia” (1954: 12). At the time, they were the only Turkic people that 
developed a middle class (Lewis 1997: 216) and become a predominantly merchant 
community. Proficiency in trade became one of the main characteristics of Volga 
Tatars (Zenkovsky 1953: 309). As reformist religion-teachers and merchants, Volga 
Tatars spread among the Turkic/Muslim communities, specifically to Central Asia. 
They have been the pioneers of religious enlightenment and national awakening 
among those communities as well as the mediators of language and culture between 
them and Russians. 
Jadidisim was a reform movement began in the areas of religion, 
historiography, language, and education respectively. However, Jadidist intellectuals 
had necessarily carried notions of national/cultural consciousness. Although these 
intellectuals were not driven by the idea of nationalism in the modern sense, their 
works on Tatar history and language prepared the ground for a modern nationalism 
and political activism. Further, for the Turkic intellectuals of Russia, religious 
identity could not be distinguished from ethnic/communal identity. Since they were 
ruled by an Orthodox empire, their religious issues became strictly intertwined with 
ethnic/communal ones (Mende 2004: 18). Therefore, Jadidism in time gave birth to 
national consciousness and political activism, which flourished by the outbreak of 
1905 Revolution. Volga Tatar intellectuals and activists began to take part in the 
political life of Russia by asserting their own national causes.  
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4.3.2 The Congresses: Political Activism and First National Movements among 
Volga Tatars 
 
The Turkic/Muslim political activists and intellectuals, under the initiative of 
mostly Volga Tatars but also including representatives from the Crimea, Caucasus, 
and Turkestan, organised a series of congresses in 1905 and 1906. These congresses 
(kurultais) marked the entrance of Volga Tatars in particular and of all Turkic 
peoples in general into the political life of the empire. 
The first concrete landmark of political activism of Volga Tatars was initiated 
by a Tatar from Tobolsk in Siberia, AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim (1857-1944). AbdurreĢid 
Ġbrahim was an extraordinary Tatar intellectual in many respects. Although a 
majority of Turkic/Muslim intellectuals had lived or received education outside of 
their homeland, mostly in Europe and/or Turkestan, AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim was literally 
a professional traveller. In addition to his journey to Switzerland and contacts with 
Russian socialists in 1896, he travelled to many countries that harboured Islamic 
population, including Turkey, Japan, Korea, Turkestan, China, Singapore, India, and 
Egypt. Another distinctive feature of AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim was his profession. Unlike 
most of his counterparts, he refused to have a religious education and maintained his 
life by petty trade (Türkoğlu 1997). Most probably, this distinctive formation made 
him the carrier of Jadidism from the intellectual arena to the political one.  
On April 5, 1905 AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim organised a small convention in his 
house together with some Azerbaijani intellectuals, Ali Merdan TopçubaĢı, Ahmed 
Agayev, and Ali Hüseyinzade. In this convention, they decided to establish a 
political party under the name of the “Alliance of Muslims” (Ittifak-ul Muslimin). 
Later, Ġsmail Bey Gaspıralı supported the idea and was included in the project 
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(Devlet 1985: 89). Under this initiative, they decided to assemble all like-minded 
Muslim intellectuals and activists in the Russian Empire in a large-scale congress.   
The First Congress of Muslims of Russia convened on August 15, 1905 in 
Nizhny Novgorod and carried out on the boat Gustav Struve on River Oka. The 
majority of participants in the congress were Volga Tatar intellectuals and wealth-
owners, among whom were Gerey Alkin, Yusuf Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, Carullah Bigi, 
and Gani Hüseyin. TopçubaĢı from Baku, Gaspıralı from the Crimea, and Haydar 
Sırtlanov from Ufa also participated. It is important to note that certain prominent 
Volga Tatar intellectuals, such as Ayaz Ġshaki, were not invited because of their 
socialist ideas (Devlet 1985: 91). The main decision at the end of the congress was 
the “unification of all Russian Muslims for the purpose of carrying out political, 
economic, and social reforms” (Rorlich 1986: 111). 
The Second Congress of Muslims of Russia convened on January 13, 1906 in 
St. Petersburg, in accordance with the decision taken in the first congress. The main 
profile of participants remained same, namely with pro-Kadet leaning and Volga 
Tatar dominance (Rorlich 1986 114). However, this time, there were efforts to gain 
support from the Kazaks, which did not prove to be successful (Devlet 1985: 96). 
The congress certified the decisions of the first congress, but the main topic in the 
agenda was to procure legal acceptance for the congresses from the Russian 
authorities (Devlet 1985: 98) and to prepare a preliminary charter for the envisaged 
political party, Ittifak (Hablemitoğlu 1997: 59).  
The ratified charter of Ittifak articulated the party‟s aim of unification of all 
Muslims in the empire, its adherence to parliamentary monarchy, its decision to 
establish local authorities of the party and to support the Kadets in the upcoming 
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Duma elections (Hablemitoğlu 1997: 62-68). Due to its alliance with the Kadets, 
Ittifak sent twenty-five deputies to the short-lived First Duma (April-July 1906) and 
constituted the Muslim Faction in the Duma. Upon the dissolving of the Duma by 
Tsar Nicholas II, Ittifak needed a third congress.  
  The third congress was held again in Nizhny Novgorod, on August 16, 1906. 
This congress, unlike the previous ones, assembled with the ratification of the 
Russian Interior Ministry. The main discussion in the congress was about the charter 
and the program of the Ittifak. Through these discussions, ideological and political 
disagreements among the participants which were kept in the background by the 
courtesy of the zeal of the initiative surfaced in a significant manner.  
Ayaz Ġshaki, who was already seen as an outsider by the majority because of 
his socialist ideas, discredited the program of Ittifak by arguing that it was prepared 
by the bourgeoisie and the wealthy (Devlet 1985: 100). Ġshaki had a point since 
Jadidism, after all, was as much an achievement of Tatar bourgeoisie as it was of 
Tatar intellectuals (Türkoğlu 2000: 108).  Further, the congresses were being funded 
by Volga Tatar wealthy men such as Gani Hüseyin. On this basis, Ishaki demanded 
for establishment of different political parties for different social classes of Muslims 
in the empire. After all, Ishaki was ideologically against Ittifak, since it was “a 
replica of the Kadet Party”, as one prominent Tatar intellectual, Abdullah Taymas, 
put it (1959: 27). 
The mastermind of the congresses, AbdurreĢid Ġbhahim, argued that Ittifak 
should not aim to unite and represent only the Muslims in the empire, but all the 
Muslims in the world (Devlet 1985: 100). In his speech during the third congress, he 
emphasised that “the Muslim brotherhood cannot be limited with twenty million 
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Muslims in the Russian Empire; since it encompasses three hundred million Muslims 
in the world (Türkoğlu 1997: 46). On the other hand, Yusuf Akçura, as the 
ideological founder of Turkism (Türkçülük) (Yemelianova 1997: 544), was opposing 
Ġbrahim by arguing that the union around religion was discredited in Europe and that 
union around nationality should be the program of the Turkic peoples of the empire. 
He referred to Poles and Czechs in Austria who were establishing political parties on 
the basis of nationality (Devlet 1985: 100). 
The only reason of division among the Turkic political activists and 
intellectuals was not that of different political orientations. Local national 
movements flourished separately and they were critical of Ittifak. One of the most 
prominent of these local national movements was the Bashkir movement under the 
leadership of the Bashkir intellectual Zeki Velidi. He claimed about Ittifak that: 
Kazan Turks [referring to Volga Tatars] were assigning themselves 
the central role among the all Turkic peoples of Russia. We knew 
that these domineering Tatar groups were trying to impose their will 
and authority on the Bashkirs, and this would have tragic results for 
us. (Togan 2003: 113). 
 
 
 
4.3.3 The Muslim Faction: Participation in the Duma 
 
 The First Russian State Duma (April 1906 - July 1906) symbolised the 
success of 1905 revolution and all factions were in one way or another in opposition 
to the Tsarist government. Kadets, constitutional democrats, were the largest faction 
in the Duma with 190 deputies (Keep 1955: 186). That was also because all social 
revolutionaries boycotted the elections, except the Mensheviks, who later stopped the 
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boycott and sent several deputies (Treadgold and Ellison 2000: 54). Therefore, in 
accordance with the power of Kadets, Ittifak, though not yet a legal political party, 
had 25 deputies in the ranks of Kadets. Among those 25 deputies, 12 were Volga 
Tatar or Bashkir (Rorlich 1986: Appendix). Volga Tatar deputies were dominantly 
from landowners, merchants, or religious figures (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1979: 5). 
Prominent Tatar intellectuals and activists were not in the Duma, save Gerey Alkin.  
 Ittifak‟s deputies in the first Duma could not be effective due to their lack of 
political experience and organisation and because of the premature dissolution of the 
Duma. However, several of Ittifak‟s deputies signed the Viborg Manifesto (Devlet 
1985: 114), which called on Russian people to civil disobedience, namely not to pay 
taxes and not to serve in the military (Chamberlin 1967: 147).   
 The second Duma (February 1907 - June 1907) had been the term during 
which the Ittifak‟s deputies had been most active and powerful. First of all, this time 
there were 35 deputies from Ittifak. Further, 29 of those deputies were organised 
under a pro-Kadet bloc named the Muslim Faction with TopçubaĢı elected as its 
leader. However, 6 social revolutionary deputies who were representing the political 
line of Ayaz Ġshaki formed another bloc called “Muslim Labour Party” and joined in 
the ranks of Trudoviki (Toilers). Those deputies in the Second Duma tried to defend 
the interests of their respective Turkic peoples in the face of proposed agrarian 
reforms and land problems (Rorlich 1986: 118).  
 The Third Duma assembled in June 1907. Stolypin modified the electoral law 
for Duma elections to the chagrin of the liberal Kadets and non-Russian nationalities 
(Devlet 1985: 116). The new electoral law completely excluded Central Asians 
(Roberts 2000: 117). Social revolutionaries again boycotted the elections, and this 
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Duma was predominantly composed of rightists, namely Octoberists and the 
newborn Progressists (Treadgold and Ellison 2000: 79). In the Third Duma there 
were only 10 Muslim deputies, of whom 7 were Volga Tatars. They again formed the 
Muslim Faction.  
 Two main issues concerning Turkic/Muslim peoples of the empire came to 
the forefront in the Third Duma: Stolypin‟s agrarian reform, and introduction of 
obligatory Russian language courses in the schools of the non-Russian nationalities 
(Devlet 1985: 117). The Muslim Faction remained ineffective in defending the rights 
of Turkic peoples regarding these issues. However, Sadri Maksudi (1879-1957), 
Volga Tatar lawyer and intellectual, as one of the deputies in the Muslim Faction, 
distinguished oneself with his fervent speeches (Taymas 1959: 28). 
 The Third Duma lasted five years. The Fourth Duma assembled in November 
1912. This Duma was characterised by the breakthrough of Russian nationalists in 
addition to the already powerful rightists (Treadgold and Ellison 2000: 81). There 
were only 7 Muslim deputies. They were totally discouraged and ineffective because 
of the new electoral law. The only noteworthy initiative of the Muslim Fraction in 
the Fourth Duma was to convene an all-Muslims congress in 1917.  
 
4.4 Volga Tatars in Revolutionary Russia 
 An All-Russian Muslims Congress convened on May 1, 1917 in the both free 
and anarchic atmosphere that prevailed after the February Revolution. This congress 
was, indeed, ideologically and organically a continuation of the tradition of the 
congresses held in 1905 and 1906. However, the political conditions had changed 
 67 
 
dramatically from 1906 to 1917, mostly because of the Great War and the February 
Revolution. As Mustafa Çokay (1890-1941), the Kazak deputy in the Muslim 
Faction in the Fourth Duma, remarked in his memoirs, the February Revolution 
brought hopes for Turkic peoples to establish their own national states (Çokay 1988: 
10). Therefore, this congress was named the “First Congress of All Muslims of 
Russia” instead of the “Fourth Congress of Muslims of Russia”.  
 The congress was organised and dominated by members of Ittifak. It was 
opened by Caucasian Ittifak member Ahmed Salihov; and the first speech was 
delivered by Volga Tatar Jadidist scholar Musa Carullah Bigi. However, this 
congress was more inclusive than those held in 1905 and 1906. 900 delegates, much 
more than the invited number, from Volga Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Azerbaijanians, 
Bashkirs, and Turkestanis participated. The marginalised socialist intellectual Ayaz 
Ishaki and Sultangaliev were elected members of the executive council (Roberts 
2000: 38). This inclusiveness of the congress, therefore, marked certain significant 
changes.  
First of all, the Great War affected positively the progress of national 
movements. As Roshwald argues (2001: 3) “the First World War telescoped some 
stages of nationalist movements into a very brief period of time”. Therefore, political 
stakes were strikingly much higher after the February Revolution when they were 
compared to the aftermath of 1905 Revolution. The power of the central authority 
was now almost absent. The “socialist spring” prowled around all over Russia, 
carrying slogans of “freedom, equality, and justice”. This caused a new enthusiasm 
among the nationalities of the empire, not least among the Turkic peoples.  
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 Secondly, the ineffectiveness of the Muslim Faction in the Dumas led to the 
questioning of the authority and competence of Ittifak. The criticism of the Tatar left, 
prominently of Ayaz Ishaki and Fuat Tuktarov, directed towards Ittifak seemed to be 
to the point (Devlet 1985: 118). With the socialist zeal brought by the February 
Revolution, social revolutionary Tatar parties, such as Tangçılar, gained 
significance. As a result, the congress had been more inclusive and ideologically 
more cosmopolitan (Ilgar 1990: X).  
  The congresses of 1905 and 1906 were convened mainly with the purpose of 
securing cultural and religious rights of the Muslims in the empire, as well as of 
establishing cooperation among them. However, the main aim of the “First Congress 
of All Muslims of Russia” was to discuss the political future of Russia and of 
Turkic/Muslim nationalities. There were three main topics in the agenda of the 
congress: religious reform, problems of religious administration (mainly the 
appointment of the Mufti), and the national question (Pipes 1954: 76-77). Therefore, 
this was the first official political gathering that carried notions of political self-
determination.    
The approach of Turkic nationalities, specifically that of All-Russian Muslim 
Congress, toward the national question and the issue of self-determination 
significantly differed from that of ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire, with 
which Russia suffered a very similar fate since the beginning of twentieth century 
(Reynolds 2011: 3). The war-weariness brought in general chaos in the empire; and 
its nationalities could think of self-determination in the atmosphere of lack of strong 
authority. However, none of the fractions and delegates of nationalities that took part 
in the congress made a proposal for complete independence from Russian rule. Such 
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a formulation of self-determination did not find place in the minds of most Turkic 
intelligentsia.  
The political, cultural, and economic life of Volga Tatars, as having coexisted 
with Russians for nearly four centuries, was highly interlocked with those of 
Russians. Although Kazan was the heartland of Volga Tatars in all respects, they 
were very much scattered across the imperial territories. Therefore, Volga Tatars, no 
matter with pro-Kadet and pro-socialist political leanings, opposed federalism and 
territorial autonomy. They defended a formulation of “extraterritorial national-
cultural autonomy”.  
On the other hand, nationalities living in borderlands could develop a stronger 
national consciousness because of their moving back and forth between practical 
borders in the course of the war (Reynolds 2011: 103). Those nationalities living in 
the borderlands of the empire, namely Azerbaijanians, Bashkirs, and Crimean Tatars, 
ideologically gathered under the leadership of Mehmet Emin Resulzade, defended 
territorial self-determination. The congress favoured territorial self-rule by vote 
despite the discontent of the most critical nationality - Volga Tatars (Pipes 1954: 77; 
Roberts 2000: 22). 
Therefore, when Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government, Turkic 
nationalities of the empire were not intending a complete secession from Russia. 
Further, although they had have produced sophisticated formulations about their 
political future, they were disunited about which formulation to adopt. This situation 
was quite to the advantage of the Bolsheviks, as it is to any political authority 
aspiring for ruling a multinational state. 
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4.5 Volga Tatars under Bolshevik Rule 
The Bolsheviks were aware of the power of national movements, especially 
those of Turkic/Muslim peoples of the empire, and they incorporated promises for 
nationalities in their policies. As Slezkine points out: 
Nations might not be helpful and they might not last [in Bolshevik 
ideology], but they were here and they were real. As far as both Lenin 
and Stalin were concerned, this meant that nations had rights: “A 
nation can organize its life as it sees fit. It has the right to organize its 
life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal 
relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. 
Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal” (1994: 416). 
 
 In November 1917, Lenin and Stalin, in the name of the Commissariat of 
Nationalities, issued the “Appeal to All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East”. The 
declaration was quite sympathetic to the national and religious causes of the 
Turkic/Muslim peoples, who had religious issues and nationality question as the two 
main topics in their agenda. It was also quite optimistic and promising for those 
nationalities: 
Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and 
Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Trans-Caucasia, 
Chechens and mountain Cossacks! All you, whose mosques and 
shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been 
violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia! Henceforward your 
beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are 
declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and 
without hindrance. It is your right. Know that your rights, like those of 
all the peoples of Russia, will be protected by the might of the 
revolution, by the Councils of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' 
Deputies! 
Support this revolution and its authorized Government! (Roberts 
2007: 21). 
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Therefore, the Bolsheviks provided the only promising proposal among the 
self-declared authorities of Russia for the Turkic/Muslim nationalities, of whose 
political activists and intelligentsia were already in disagreement about the 
formulation of their political future. They envisaged the critical role of national 
movements and incorporated appealing promises for the Turkic/Muslim nationalities 
of Russia in their policies. These promises found support on the side of those 
nationalities and contributed as a political support to the consolidation of the 
Bolshevik Revolution and indirectly to the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War. 
 
4.5.1 Sultangaliev and National Communism 
 
The Bolsheviks had already declared in March 1918 their project of 
establishing a “Tatar-Bashkir Republic” in the Volga-Ural region, in accordance with 
their promise of self-determination. As claimed in the previous section, this promise 
of the Bolsheviks found considerable appeal from Volga Tatars. However, the 
legitimacy of the Bolshevik power was not unequivocally recognized by all fractions 
among Volga Tatars. Tatar right, namely Ittifak, and conservatives (Qadimists) were 
opposing the Bolsheviks because of the latter‟s attitude towards religion. Both the 
liberal Jadidists and socialists were suspicious towards the Bolshevik project of self-
determination, because instead of self-determination they rather envisaged an 
extraterritorial national-cultural autonomy under the name of Idel-Ural Republic 
within a united Russia. The socialist Ayaz Ishaki emerged as the most ardent 
advocate of the Idel-Ural Republic (Taymas 1958: 39). Later he would spearhead the 
Volga Tatar national émigré opposition with his journal Milli Yul (the National Path), 
which was published between 1928 and 1935.  
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On the other hand, the Bashkir leader Zeki Velidi rejected the Bolshevik 
project of Tatar-Bashkir Republic and sided with Admiral Kolchak to establish a 
separate state for Bashkirs. However, his alliance with the Whites proved to be 
ephemeral. He was provisionally and tactically supported by the Bolsheviks and 
proclaimed the Bashkir Autonomous Republic in March 1919. Zeki Velidi‟s opting 
for a separate Bashkir state instead of a united Idel-Ural or Tatar-Bashkir republic, 
therefore, was to be the main breaking point for the problematic Tatar-Bashkir 
relations.  
Communist Tatar Jadidists, led by Sultangaliev, had been the main pioneers 
in conveying the Bolshevik Revolution among Volga Tatars. Sultangaliev, along 
with Mullanur Vahitov, shaped the policies of the Muslim Committee, which was 
operating under the Narkomnats (People‟s Commissariat of Nationalities) headed by 
Stalin. Sultangaliev had his original thesis about the relationship between Marxism 
and Islam. He considered socialist and proletarian character as indispensable notions 
of national movements of the Muslim nationalities (Rorlich 1982: 19; Tellal 2001: 
111-112). Not only the Communist Jadidists, but also the mainstream Tatar 
nationalist movement, Milli Mejlis (the National Congress), which was the 
continuation of the Ittifak movement, came to a compromise with the Bolsheviks. 
Sadri Maksudi established an autonomous government in November 1917; however, 
the Bolshevik support for him did last only two months (Yemelianova 1988:  101).  
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4.5.2 The Establishment of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(TASSR) 
 
As of 1920, the future of self-determination promised by the Bolsheviks for 
Volga Tatars was still ambiguous. Idel-Ural Republic was overthrown by the 
Bolsheviks and the project of Tatar-Bashkir Republic was not concretely established 
(DevletĢin 1981: 279). It seemed that the Bolsheviks did not have a substantial plan 
for the future political formation of the Volga-Ural region. With Volga Tatars‟ 
mistrust of the Bolsheviks because of religious drives, this uncertainty led to an 
uprising mainly in Kazan, Ufa, Simbirsk, and Samara, which is known as “Black 
Hawk Revolt” (DevletĢin 1981: 282; Daulet 2003: 495). The revolt was suppressed 
by the Red Army. Most probably, after that point the Bolsheviks felt the necessity of 
giving a concrete shape to the future of Volga Tatars.  
 On May 27, 1920 the Bolsheviks declared Tatarstan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic as a sub-state within the Russian Soviet Socialist Federation. 
Sultangaliev, quite uncomfortable with this arrangement, struggled to convince Lenin 
to the idea of a united Tatar-Bashkir republic to the last minute (Rorlich 1986: 138). 
The organization of the new republic, however, was far from satisfying any of the 
national demands on the part of Volga Tatars. First of all, the new TASSR included 
only slightly more than one-fourth of Volga Tatars within its borders (DevletĢin 
1981: 287). To make the matters worse, now there was a considerable number of 
Bashkirs within the TASSR and of Tatars within the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic.  
Secondly, the territory of TASSR was far smaller than the short-lived Idel-
Ural Republic.  Volga Tatars, now left with a downsized state instead of an Idel Ural 
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Republic which aspired to rule over the whole Turkic/Muslim peoples in the lower 
Volga, felt that they would shrink into insignificance with respect to their leader 
status among the Turkic/Muslim peoples of Russia. Volga Tatar intellectuals were 
trying to portray themselves, contrary to the fact, as an equal to the union republics 
(DevletĢin 1981: 62).  
During the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, to reverse this degradation had been 
the main drive in Tatar politics and national activism. In 1977, Tatar politicians and 
intellectuals petitioned to the Soviet government with the demand of being upgraded 
to the status of union republic (Graney 2009: 18). The claim for the status of union 
republic was the main theme in the sovereignty declaration of August 1990 (Graney 
2009: 25). Interestingly, the scholarly examinations of Soviet policies towards the 
Volga Tatars generally do not take into account this political and psychological 
aspect of Volga Tatars‟ grievances under the Soviet rule. They tend to limit Tatar 
concerns only with religious matters (Benningsen and Wimbush 1986; Akiner 1983; 
Rorlich 1982; Yemelianova 1988). 
 
4.5.3 Tatar National Identity under the Soviet Rule 
 
 During the first decade of TASSR, the Volga Tatar national intelligentsia, 
though not satisfied with the arrangement of their new state, welcomed the 
opportunity came with the official Soviet policy of korenizatsiia (nativisation) and 
took significant steps in consolidation the national character of the republic and 
maintaining Tatar culture (Rorlich 1986: 153).  
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 In 1921, the Academic Centre was established by the People‟s Commissariat 
of Education. The Academic Centre was carrying out researches on Tatar language, 
preparing school textbooks, and translating important works from foreign languages 
into Tatar. In the same year, the History and Culture Centre was founded; and began 
research on literature and folk culture. In 1924, the Tatarology Research Centre, the 
Tatarstan Pedagogy Centre, and a separate Tatarstan Library were established. In 
1927, Tatar Cultural Home was established. In 1928, several research centres and 
writers‟ unions were founded (DevletĢin 1981: 402-403). Further, in the same year, 
pseudo-academic and literary journals of Beznen Yul (Our Path), Magarif 
(Education), and Tataristan were started to be published (DevletĢin 1981: 404). 
 The principle purpose of those national-cultural activities of the Volga Tatars 
was their concern with the development of the Tatar language and reforming its 
Arabic alphabet into a simpler format, which had already been, indeed, an earlier 
concern of the Volga Tatars.  
 The breaking-point for the Soviet attitude towards the Volga Tatars was 
marked by the reaction of the CPSU to an article by Galimcan Ibragimov, the editor 
of the journal Beznen Yul, titled “Which Way Will Tatar Culture Go?”, published in 
1927 (Rorlich 1974: 364). In this article, Ibragimov asserted that “Tatar people will 
tread not the path of being assimilated by some other cultures but that of developing 
on its own culture on the basis of its native language” (quoted in DevletĢin 1981: 
405). 
 After this breaking-point, at the end of the 1920s, the Soviet policy towards 
Volga Tatars ceased to cooperate with the national-communist cadres and to appeal 
to religious, cultural, and national rights. It began to take shape of an anti-national 
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and anti-religious policy (Devlet 1985: 108).  This policy was characterised by 
discrimination toward Tatar language (Rorlich 1986: 153) and propaganda against 
religion (Rorlich 1982: 18). The adoption of Latin alphabet in 1927 instead of the 
Arabic script that Tatars had been using found reaction from the Tatar intelligentsia, 
mostly prominently from Ibragimov. These intellectuals saw this decision as a tool of 
Russification of Tatars.  
 Further, although Tatar was declared as the official language of TASSR along 
with Russian, in time, Russian had turned to be the only de facto official language 
(DevletĢin 1981: 363-364). The Soviet policy towards language continued after the 
prelude of World War II, during which Soviet nationalities policy was revised in 
favour of the nationalities to “boost the morale of the population” (Devlet 1985: 
109). A law enacted in 1958 entailed that families had to choose between Russian 
and Tatar schools. To meet the requirements of the de facto condition, they generally 
had to choose Russian schools. Further, education in Russian was highly encouraged 
by the policies of the Soviet rule. Textbooks in Tatar cost much higher than those in 
Russian (DevletĢin 1981: 364-366). 
 The first official anti-religious propaganda in Tatar language took place in the 
first issue of Fen hem Din (Science and Religion) in 1925 (Rorlich 1982: 24). In 
1930s, the anti-religious propaganda escalated. 10 newspapers and 23 journals, 
which is more than the number of all other anti-religious propaganda journals in 
other Turkic languages, were mainly being published for this purpose (Devlet 1985: 
108). These policies were moderated only during the period World War II, when the 
Muftiat (religious administration of Muslims) in Ufa was entrusted legal status by 
Stalin in 1942 (Devlet 1985: 109). 
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 The Soviet experience, therefore, had been derogatory for the national and 
cultural development of the Volga Tatars (Lazzerini, 1982: 61). Already In 1973, 
there were a considerable number of Tatars who could not communicate in Tatar 
language at all (DevletĢin 1981: 379).  When the Soviet Union dissolved, national 
identity meant for some Tatars not more than the official record on their passports 
(Lewis 1997: 217). 
4.7 Volga Tatars in the Russian Federation 
Starting with Gorbachev‟s perestroika, main lines of political groups, which 
are nationalists, socialists, and centrists, emerged in Tatarstan (Devlet 2008: 218). 
The first prominent political organization, Tatar İctimaiy Üzegi (Tatar Public 
Centre), came as a civil society association. Tatar Public Centre was founded by a 
group of academicians in Kazan State University. They were on the socialist-
democrat side of the political spectrum; however they later turned to be moderate 
nationalists. They aimed to work for sovereignty of Tatarstan and for the protection 
of Tatars‟ cultural and economic rights, but they did not reject the Soviet rule. 
However, they had been producing projects for maintaining Tatar culture since from 
1982 (Gorenburg 2003: 54).  
 Nationalists were represented by the party Ittifak and the youth organization 
Azatlık (literally “freedom”).  Ittifak, which was founded by Rafael Muhammeddinov 
in March 1990 and taken over by Fevziye Bayramova in 1991, is a resurrection of 
the first Tatar political organization Ittifak that was founded in 1906. The primary 
aim of Ittifak was articulated as “establishing an independent Tatar state”. They also 
retained notions of Turkic and Muslim unity (Devlet 2008: 220). The movement 
Azatlık, on the other hand, envisaged Tatarstan‟s future as directly intertwined with 
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the Turkic world. It defended outright independence and strong relations with the 
fellow Turkic nations.  
 
4.7.1 The Path to Sovereignty 
  
 Mintimer Shaimiev, who began his political career as the Minister for 
Melioration and Water Resources of the TASSR in 1969 (Bukharaev 2007: 38) and 
became the First Secretary of the Tatar Oblast Committee of CPSU in 1989, had 
been the most influential and strongest political leader in the post-Soviet Tatarstan. 
He described himself as a “centrist” (Bukharaev 1999: 2). He was elected as the 
Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic in 1990. During the chaotic environment of the parades of sovereignty, he 
sought to keep a balance between Moscow and the nationalist demands in Tatarstan 
(Williams 2011: 95). The influence of the nationalist parties and movements had 
peaked in the year 1990 and Shaimiev declared sovereignty of Tatarstan on August 
30, not only on behalf of ethnic Tatars, but in the name of the multiethnic people of 
Tatarstan (Bukharaev 1999: 3). His political constitution and diplomatic skills were 
strong and he managed to get support from almost all political groups in Tatarstan 
(Devlet 2008: 222). 
 Shaimiev was to remain as an ardent centrist until the end of his twenty years 
of presidency, which he carried out de facto until 1996 and as elected for two terms 
on end until 2010. However, his incorporation of Tatar nationalism and practice of 
ethnic politics (Guiliano 2000: 309) came after 1991, when Tatarstan Supreme 
Soviet recognized the sovereignty declaration. Shaimiev demanded extensive 
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autonomy and special rights for Tatarstan; and the power-sharing treaty between 
Tatarstan and the Russian Federation could not be signed until 1994. Within this 
period, the political stance as well as civil society activities had been nationalistic 
and irredentist; since they tended to address not only Tatars in Tatarstan but all 
Volga Tatars in the Russian Federation, and even the Volga Tatar diaspora in Finland 
(Devlet 2008: 225). 
 
4.7.2 Power-Sharing with Moscow and Tatarstan’s Post- Soviet Sovereignty 
 
 Tatarstan‟s post-Soviet sovereignty is legally based on three main documents: 
Declaration On the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan (August 30, 1990), 
Treaty on Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Powers between Bodies of 
Public Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the 
Republic of Tatarstan (February 15, 1994) (thereafter referred as the “Power-Sharing 
Treaty”), and Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan (1992).  
 The Declaration of Sovereignty was promulgated by Mintimer Shaimiev, as 
the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic at the 
time. The Declaration reveals the two main drives behind Tatarstan‟s “sovereignty 
project” (Graney 2009: xx). The first and foremost one was the aim of reversing, or 
at least modifying, the historical degradation of the status of Volga Tatars with 
respect to Russians and to the Turkic/Muslim peoples of Russia. This notion is 
clearly expressed in the preamble of the Declaration as “realising the historical 
responsibility for the fortunes of multinational peoples”, “realising the incapability of 
the status of the Autonomous Republic”, and “ensuring the inherent rights of Tatars”. 
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Accordingly, the first article of the Declaration of sovereignty proclaims that 
Tatarstan “reforms the Autonomous Republic into the Tatar Soviet Socialist 
Republic - The Republic of Tatarstan”. So many times in the Declaration, and in 
each and every article, it is emphasised that Tatarstan is no longer an ASSR but a 
SSR.  
 The second drive was Shaimiev‟s aim of usurping as much power as possible 
in the chaotic period of the parade of sovereignties without severing his relationship 
with the Soviet authorities and the federal centre, Moscow. The Declaration 
(Appendix A), which can be indeed interpreted as a potential secessionist initiative, 
did not openly threaten the territorial integrity and nominal authority of the Soviet 
Union and the Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic. Instead, it had made 
clear that the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic “express[es] 
respect to sovereign rights of all the peoples, inhabiting the Russian Federation and 
USSR” and “aim[s] at the creation of legal democratic state.” Further, Article 6 
makes it clear that as long as the Declaration is not violated the “acts and normative 
documents” enacting Tatarstan-RFSSR and Tatarstan- the USSR relations were to be 
remain valid. 
 Tatarstan refused to sign the Federal Treaty in April 1992 on the basis that 
special provisions are vitally necessary for Tatarstan to take part as a sovereign state 
in the new federal system of Russia. Tatarstan had held a referendum in March, in 
which 61 per cent of Tatarstan‟s population voted for the sovereignty of Tatarstan 
described in the Declaration and for the presidency of Shaimiev. The result of the 
referendum strengthened the already strong leverage at the hands of Shaimiev 
(Graney 2009: 35); and even the idea of a referendum alarmed Yeltsin (Bukharaev 
2007: 52).  
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 Further, the Constitution of Tatarstan became a matter of disagreement 
between Kazan and Moscow, but Tatarstan Supreme Soviet approved the draft in 
November 1992 with few changes among many demanded by the Federal 
government on the basis that constituent units‟ constitutions should be in accordance 
with the Federal Constitution (Graney 2009: 35). The Constitution asserts that “the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan shall consist in full possession of the State 
authority (legislative, executive and judicial) beyond the competence of the Russian 
Federation”; and that Tatarstan is “a democratic constitutional State associated with 
the Russian Federation” and “a subject of the Russian Federation” (“Constitution of 
Tatarstan, Article-1”, kcn.ru).  
 Negotiations between hesitative Yeltsin and determined Shaimiev for a 
power-sharing treaty continued for two years. The Power-Sharing Treaty (Appendix 
B) was signed in February 1994, which clearly guaranteed the sovereignty of 
Tatarstan as Shaimiev demanded. The Treaty recognised Tatarstan and the Russian 
Federation as equals in sovereignty (Preamble and Article 1), endorsed the 
Constitution of Tatarstan (Article 2), and recognised the Republic of Tatarstan as “a 
state - a constituent entity of the Russian Federation - possess[ing] full state authority 
beyond the competence of the Russian Federation” (Article 2). The Treaty granted 
Tatarstan the authority to carry out external relations with federal entities and foreign 
states, though in a limited way for the latter (Article 2). Tatar is recognised as the 
state language along with Russian (Article 2) and secured the right for special Tatar 
passports (Article 3).  
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4.7.3 The “Tatarstan Model” 
 
 Tatarstan‟s influence, as a “restless region” (Latter 1993: 6), on the future and 
in the domestic politics of the Russian Federation was by no means less than 
significant (Bukharaev 2007: 18) during especially Yeltsin era. Tatarstan was seen as 
a “classical case of the secessionist process” in the academic audience (Zverev 2002: 
134).  
 Given Yeltsin‟s suffering from Chechen separatism, it can be argued that the 
prospect of a possible separatist movement in Tatarstan was one of the most anxious 
concerns of Yeltsin. Even as early as 1990, after the declaration of sovereignty, 
Yeltsin attempted to remove Shaimiev (Bahry 2005: 139). Tatarstan, unlike 
Chechnya, was geographically at the very centre of the lands of the Russian 
Federation and economically one of the most developed and most critical regions 
among all (McCann 2005: 78). Further, Tatarstan was not on the agenda of the 
Russian domestic politics alone. International audience had also begun to direct 
attention to the case of Tatarstan (Bukharaev 1999: 2). At the same time, Tatarstan 
developed its own “Conception of the Foreign Economic Policy” in 1993 and 
emerged as an actor on the international scene (Sharafutdinova 2003: 616).  
 Shaimiev‟s balanced policy between nationalists and the centre emerged as 
„the Tatar Model‟ (Bukharaev 1999: 3; Yemelianova 1999: 448) in the face of 
Chechen example. For that matter, Yeltsin had to give concessions from a strong 
federalism and signed a special power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan. This privileged 
arrangement with Tatarstan triggered a domino effect; and other subjects of the 
Federation, though not as bold as Tatarstan, demanded similar treaties. Bilateral 
power-sharing treaties had become a common practice until Putin was appointed as 
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the head of FSB and initiated the project “The Law on Regions”, which would 
redefine federal relations (Sakwa 2008: 189). However, even after Putin‟s federal 
reforms, Tatar intellectuals still maintain and cherish notions of independence 
(Ishakov 2005: 7).  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 The history of Volga Tatars, the second greatest ethnic group in numbers after 
ethnic Russians, has been intricately intertwined with that of Russians. The conquest 
of Kazan was the first great landmark in the formation of Volga Tatar identity. In the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Volga Tatars started to develop a substantial 
national movement in the modern sense, as the first Turkic people to do so. Their 
ultimate siding with the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, let alone satisfying their 
national demands, degraded their status of political and intellectual leadership among 
the Turkic/Muslim peoples of Russia. This can be marked as the second great 
landmark in the formation of their identity. The significance of Tatarstan increased 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Along with Chechnya, Tatarstan became one 
of the most critical regions of the Russian Federation. Although Putin‟s federal 
reforms curtailed this significance, Tatarstan, with its influence on Russian domestic 
and foreign relations continues to be important instance of the significance of ethnic 
politics. This last point is to be elaborated in the next chapter with a focus on 
Russian-Turkish relations.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE ROLE OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE 
INFLUENCE OF TATARSTAN IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
 
 
 
 
“Still, our country has another distinctive feature, as compared to other countries, 
where many peoples and nationalities reside. Our country was originally formed as a 
multiethnic state. [...] I believe there are no such countries in the world. There are 
countries mostly inhabited by immigrants, like the United States, for instance. But in 
Russia each ethnic group occupies its national territory and has its own roots.” 
 
- Vladimir Putin, At a meeting with representatives of confessions and ethnic and 
public organisations, 19 July 2011 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The role of ethnic politics in foreign policy-making is one of the under-
examined subjects in International Relations. The subject can be seen as indirectly 
analysed mainly in three areas of study in the discipline: ethnic conflict, foreign 
intervention, and diaspora studies. However, the direct influence of one of the most 
significant phenomena in the post-Cold War period, ethnic politics, goes 
 85 
 
unexamined. In this chapter, the role of ethnic politics in foreign policy-making is 
examined with reference to the role of Tatarstan in Russian-Turkish relations.  
 Tatarstan, a national autonomous republic of a titular nation, has carried an 
influential ethnic politics under Russian rule through many chapters of its history. As 
it was analysed in the previous chapter, the impact of its ethnic politics has become 
substantively significant in influencing Russian domestic politics during Yeltsin era. 
This chapter aims to analyse the role of ethnic politics in international relations in 
general, and in foreign policies of states in particular, by focusing on the role of 
Tatarstan in Turkish-Russian relations.  
 
5.2 Tatarstan’s Foreign Relations 
 As Valuev puts it, Tatarstan is a perfect example of “the way in which the 
boundary between domestic and international spheres is becoming increasingly 
blurred” (2002: 8). By the virtue of its constitution, “within its competence the 
Republic of Tatarstan shall independently participate in international and foreign 
economic relations.” (“Constitution of Tatarstan, Article 1 - Clause 4”, kcn.ru). From 
the declaration of sovereignty in 1990 until the signing of the power-sharing treaty in 
1994, Tatarstan acted as a de facto independent actor in international system 
(Sharafutdinova 2003: 613) and as a sub-state unit of the Russian Federation at the 
same time. This peculiarity of Tatarstan‟s political status continued after 1994, since 
it retained extensive rights of establishing its own foreign relations. 
 Tatarstan‟s foreign relations in a sovereign manner began after 1990 as semi-
diplomatic contacts; and became more official with the establishment of the Ministry 
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of Foreign Economic Affairs in 1993 (Sharafutdinova 2003: 616). Later in 1997, this 
ministry was reorganised as Department of Foreign Affairs of the President of 
Tatarstan. Under this department, Tatarstan formulated its own foreign policy 
concept and began to educate its own diplomats. For this purpose, the department of 
International Relations at the Kazan State University was opened in 1995, with the 
aim of “producing representatives of Tatarstan for the world stage” (Graney 2004: 
277).   
 On the other hand, Tatarstan established its own contacts with the United 
Nations during its de facto independence period. As a part of its “sovereignty 
project” (Graney 2009: xxxi), Tatarstan strived for membership in the United 
Nations, in the manner that Ukraine and Belarus enjoyed under the USSR (Malik 
1994). In 1994, The United Nations assistant Secretary General Joseph Verner Reed 
officially visited Tatarstan; and between 1993 and 1997 two UNESCO conferences 
were held in Kazan (Graney 2004: 274). The cooperation with the United Nations 
still continues, however more loosely than before. The UN Special Adviser on 
Sports, Wilfried Lemke, visited Kazan as a part of his official visit to Russia in May 
2011, and stated that he is very impressed by the cultural and ethnic integration in 
Tatarstan, where two large religious groups are living in harmony; and he will, as a 
representative of the United Nations, will promote this example (“UN Special 
Adviser Strengthens Cooperation with Russia”, un.org).  
 Further, Tatarstan signed cooperation treaties with Chechnya and Abkhazia, 
respectively in 1993 and 1994, as a leverage for consolidating its authority of 
performing foreign relations (Valuev 2002: 27). It also established foreign 
representatives in a sovereign manner during 1990s. A Permanent Representative 
Office in Azerbaijan; Plenipotentiary Representative Offices in France, Kazakhstan, 
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Turkey, and Turkmenistan; a Representative Office in Uzbekistan; and Trade and 
Economic Representative Offices in Finland, Belarus, Cuba, Vietnam, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, Ukraine, the USA were established.  
  
5.3 Tatarstans’s Place in Turkish-Russian Relations since 1990 
 In terms of foreign policy, Turkey and Russia have a common distinctive 
characteristic. Both countries have, or at least ascribe themselves, a unique 
position/identity politically and geographically within the international community 
(Warhola and Mitchell 2006: 128). Building upon this premise, these countries 
define their foreign policies not only in political and strategic terms, but also, indeed 
necessarily, in ideational terms.  
 Certainly, Turkish-Russian relations are not shaped around ethnic matters. 
Since the imperial times strategic and political matters predominated over others. 
During the Cold War, bipolar nuclear and political friction almost fully trivialised 
ethnic and cultural issues. However, with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, and with concurrently rising national mobilisations, ethnic and 
cultural, or civilisational (Bilgin 2004), matters gained significance, which was quite 
visible in the case of Turkish-Russian relations (Torbakov 2007: 3). 
 Therefore, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one of the most 
important chapters of Turkish-Russian relations had been shaped around a mostly 
ethnic matter - Turkish foreign policy towards the newly independent Turkic states in 
Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Turkish foreign policy experienced an emergence of 
great zeal towards the Central Asia.  First and foremost, Turkey recognised ethnic 
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unity with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan by 
declaring those states as kith and kin. Secondly, Turkey has been presented as a 
proper model for these newly independent Turkic states. Thirdly, various state 
branches and international organisations were established within the context of the 
Turkic World.  
 Although Turkey‟s relations with the Turkic states had been close and intense 
during the 1990s, and Turkey claimed itself as a contender for dominance in Central 
Asia (Kramer 1996: 114); Turkey, at the state level, did not pursue a policy of Pan-
Turkism (Landau 1995: 222). However, Russian perception of Turkey‟s such 
activities had always been perceived as Pan-Turkism, and as the ghost of Enver 
Pasha resurrecting, which threatens the “backyard” and even the very heartland of 
Russia (Sezer 2001: 153-154).   
 Tatarstan is not one of the fundamental issues that shape Turkish-Russian 
relations. That is because, as previously indicated, ethnic politics has a peculiar 
modus vivendi; it becomes much more significant during certain period of times and 
in certain contexts. Accordingly, the place of Tatarstan in Turkish foreign policy 
concept was integrated within the context of Turkey‟s policy towards Turkic World 
during 1990s. When Turkey‟s Turkic World policy came to a regression, however, 
Tatarstan has found its individual place as a promoting chapter in Turkish-Russian 
relations. Ultimately, therefore, the “Tatarstan factor” in Turkish-Russian relations is 
an established reality (Devlet 1998: 128).   
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5.4. The 1990s: Tatarstan as a Part of Turkic World 
 
 Although Turkey‟s new foreign policy toward the Turkic World was shaped 
around the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan, other Turkic peoples with an 
autonomous state or even without any recognition at all in Eurasia was included in 
this policy. Tatarstan, which remained as an autonomous republic within the Russian 
Federation after 1991, was politically the most significant of non-independent Turkic 
peoples, since it rejected the federal agreement presented by Yeltsin and demanded 
full-fledged sovereignty. For this purpose, Shaimiev convened a World Tatar 
Congress on 19-21 June 1992 in Kazan. Turkey sent a formal representative, Namık 
Kemal Zeybek, the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, to the congress.  
 Following that, Shaimiev was invited to Turkey quasi-officially in October 
1992 (Devlet 1998: 129-130). In 1996, after the power-sharing agreement between 
Kazan and Moscow was signed and Tatarstan‟s status was settled as an autonomous 
republic, Turkey paid an official visit under the presidency of Minister of State to 
Tatarstan. Further, a Turkish Consulate General in Kazan and the Plenipotentiary 
Representative Office of the Republic of Tatarstan in Turkey were established 
respectively in 1996 and 1997. Although these relations were mostly semi-official, 
nonetheless Tatarstan‟s relations with Turkey became the sign of its independent 
foreign policy (Selbach 2001: 10) Therefore, during the 1990s Tatarstan could find a 
considerable place in the Turkish Foreign Policy concept within the context of 
Turkey‟s policy towards the Turkic World.  
 Since the beginning of 1990s, Tatarstan has found its place in the Turkish 
foreign policy concept. Turkey has a Consulate General in Kazan, which has a 
formal precedence over other Consulate Generals in St. Petersburg and 
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Novorossiysk. Furthermore, Tatarstan is an associate member of The International 
Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), which is accredited by the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry as “an international organisation with diplomatic status” and aims 
at developing relations with Turkic-speaking states and peoples (“Orta Asya Ülkeleri 
ile ĠliĢkiler” mfa.gov.tr).   
On the other hand, as previously noted, Tatarstan operates a diplomatic 
representation through the Plenipotentiary Representative Office of the Republic of 
Tatarstan in Turkey since 1997. The Office aims to provide coordination among 
Turkey, Russia, and Tatarstan; and to promote cooperation “in the fields of trade, 
economy, science, technology, and culture” (“Cooperation between Tatarstan and 
Turkey”, tatartrade.com). The mission of the Office does not clearly states political 
purposes, but indeed it has at least a quasi-political status. As a matter of fact, the 
Speaker of the Tatarstan Parliament, Farid Mukhammedshin, during his meeting with 
the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, in 2011, emphasised the significance of the 
support that Turkey provides for the Representative Office of Tatarstan in Turkey 
(“Tataristan Parlamento BaĢkanı KöĢk‟te”, tccb.gov.tr).   
 
5.5 The 2000s: Tatarstan as a Chapter in Turkish-Russian Relations 
 Towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, Turkey‟s policy 
towards the Turkic World had become structuralised and Russia‟s anxieties about 
Pan-Turkism began to wear off. Further, economic relations and energy partnership 
between Russia and Turkey became much more significant. Therefore, Turkish-
Russian relations shifted from a bothersome relationship to a closer cooperation. 
Especially after Prime Minister Erdoğan‟s visit to Moscow in December 2004 and 
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President Putin‟s reciprocal visit to Ankara in January 2005, cooperation became 
stronger. These visits were even interpreted as Turkey‟s message to the Europe by 
considering Russia as an ally that can replace the European Union (Warhola and 
Mitchell 2006: 127) .  
 
5.5.1 Official Visit of the President of Turkey to Tatarstan 
 
 Together with this turn in Turkish-Russian relations at the beginning of the 
2000s, Turkey‟s policy towards Tatarstan has taken a new shape. Turkey began to 
see Tatarstan as a promoting chapter of Turkey-Russian relations. In an article in 
Turkish foreign ministry‟s website, titled “Turkey‟s Political Relations with Russian 
Federation”, Tatarstan is defined as “a brotherly country with which Turkey has 
historical and cultural ties” (“Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi ĠliĢkileri”, 
mfa.gov.tr).  
 Accordingly, on 12-15 February 2009, the President of Turkey Abdullah Gül 
visited Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. This visit is labelled as a “historic visit”, since 
it was the first visit from Turkey to Tatarstan at the presidential level. The President 
of Turkey emphasised the importance that Turkey gives to relations with Tatarstan 
by stating the aim of “mak[ing] more business, and chase[ing] common goals” 
(“Gul‟s Historic Visit to Tatarstan”, turkishweekly.net). 
 Gül‟s visit has been significant for both Turkish-Tatar relations and 
Tatarstan‟s own foreign relations. As for Turkish-Tatar relations, visiting Kazan after 
visits to Moscow seemed to become a regular practice, as the Prime Minister of 
Turkey visited Tatarstan two years later. The impact of Gül‟s visit on Tatarstan‟s 
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foreign relations was acknowledged by Farid Mukhammedshin, Speaker of Tatarstan 
Parliament. Mukhammedshin stated that Gül‟s visit “marked an era for the Republic 
of Tatarstan, since the presidents of Finland and Austria paid visits to Tatarstan after 
Gül‟s visit” (“Tataristan Parlamento BaĢkanı KöĢk‟te”, tcbb.gov.tr).  
 
5.5.2 Official Visit of the Prime Minister of Turkey to Tatarstan 
 
 The visit of the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, to Kazan in 2009, has 
been a milestone in Turkish-Tatarstan relations. After that visit, Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan paid an official visit to Tatarstan in March 2011. The visit was 
given great significance by Tatarstan, Russia, and Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister 
stated that “it was my long-held dream to visit Tatarstan and I‟m happy to be the first 
Prime Minister of Turkey to visit your republic” (“Turkish Prime Minister Visits 
Kazan”, president.tatarstan.ru). Erdoğan also emphasised that “hearts of Tatar and 
Turkish nations beat in unison” since these two nations are “brothers sharing a 
common culture, history, and belief” and that “if our brothers are troubled, we are 
also troubled; and we take our positions if they face any injustice” (“Turkish Prime 
Minister Visits Kazan”, president.tatarstan.ru). These statements of Erdoğan 
disturbed Russia, and he had to emphasise that “Turkey does not have otherwise 
purposes, and is not in a struggle for influence” (“Farklı Gayeler Ġçinde Değiliz”, 
Cumhuriyet).  
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5.5.3 Official Speech of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tatarstan  
 
 Another milestone in Turkish foreign policy concerning Tatarstan was the 
Commemoration Program for Tatar National Poet Abdullah Tukay‟s 124th Birthday 
which was organised by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador of Russian 
Federation to Turkey and Counsellor of Foreign Relations of President of Tatarstan 
attended the meeting. Turkish minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu gave a 
comprehensive speech, which indeed, sketched the place of Tatarstan within Turkish 
foreign policy concept.  
 Along with the emphasis on Abdullah Tukay, Davutoğlu briefly analysed the 
lives and works of Tatar Jadidists, such as Yusuf Akçura, AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim, 
Sultangaliev, and Carullah Bigi; and thereafter he presented himself intellectually as 
“a member of this Jadidist tradition”.  He characterised the Jadidist movement as a 
global representative of the greater Turkic culture. Furthermore, he mentioned the 
affiliation of Tolstoy and Lenin with the city of Kazan.  
 However, more strikingly than that, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
described Kazan as “a place that brings the East and the West, the Turk and the 
Russian, together; and as a miraculous city with its settled culture in the face of 
numerous nomadic ones all across the Eurasia. Thereupon, he characterised Tatarstan 
as “a great bridge of friendship between Russia and Turkey”.  Thereby, Davutoğlu 
indeed recognised the common distinctive characteristics of Turkish and Russian 
foreign policies, which is commitment to multiple identities of East and West. 
Further, this speech, along with Turkish President‟s visit to Kazan in 2009 and Prime 
Minister‟s speeches during his visit to Kazan in 2010, formulates a new place for 
Tatarstan within the Turkish foreign policy concept. According to this new 
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formulation, Tatarstan is seen as a promoting chapter in Turkish-Russian relations, 
rather than being a part of Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic World.  
 Turkey‟s conception of Tatarstan as a “bridge” between Turkey and Russia is 
also officially recognised by Tatarstan. The President of the Tatarstan Parliament, 
Farid Mukhammedshin, emphasised not only the unity of Tatarstan and Turkey in 
language and culture but also the importance of the political activities of Yusuf 
Akçura and Sadri Maksudi Arsal in the early phases of Turkish Republic. He also 
ascribed utmost salience to the economic and commercial relations between Turkey 
and Tatarstan. Finally, he described Tatarstan as a “bridge of friendship” between 
Russia and Turkey (“Tataristan Rusya ile Türkiye arasında Köprüdür”, 
turkish.ruvr.ru). 
 
5.6 Economic Relations between Turkey and Tatarstan 
 Economic relations and trade partnerships have a peculiar and important 
place in Turkey-Tatarstan relations, in a way that they are complementary of the 
cautious and limited political relations (Kamalov 2008: 83). Tatarstan has a separate 
representative office in Istanbul, Tatar Trade House, which is exclusively founded 
for economic and commercial purposes in 1995.  
The economic activity between Turkey and Tatarstan is shaped around five 
main areas, which are crude oil export, petrochemical products, machinery, real-
estate, and energy and industrial production (“Address by General Manager”, 
tatartrade.com). Along these main lines of economic activity, a large number of 
 95 
 
Turkish and Tatar companies, including Tatneft and TupraĢ, have cooperation 
treaties.  
Tatarstan‟s exports to Turkey constitute 10 % of total foreign trade turnover 
of Tatarstan. Further, Turkish-Tatar trade volume constitutes 10 % of total turnover 
between Turkey and Russian Federation (“Cooperation between Tatarstan and 
Turkey”, tatartrade.com). During his visit to Kazan, Turkey‟s Prime Minister 
Erdoğan declared that Turkey aims to increase its trade volume with Russia to $ 100 
million dollar a year. He emphasised that Turkey aims to maintain this growth 
through higher economic cooperation with Tatarstan (“Turkey to step up trade with 
Tatarstan”, eng.tatar-inform.ru). Further, Turkey is listed as several main trade 
partners of Tatarstan by Tatarstan Ministry of Industry and Trade (“Foreign Trade 
Partners of Tatarstan”, mpt.tatarstan.ru). 
  
5.7 Conclusion 
 Tatarstan is not an issue in Turkish foreign policy upon which Turkish-
Russian relations are based. However, it has had a certain influence in shaping 
Turkish-Russian relations. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan was 
seen as a part of the greater Turkic World, towards which Turkey formulated a new 
foreign policy concept during 1990s. During the 2000s, with the regression of the 
Turkic World policy, Tatarstan has been seen as a promoting actor that is positively 
influencing Turkish-Russian relations. The “Tatarstan factor” in Turkish-Russian 
relations, as a specific case study, therefore, reflects the significance of ethnic 
politics that is beyond conflict in international relations.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
 Esman (1994: 1-2) noted that “ethnic identity, ethnic solidarity, and ethnic 
conflict are by no means new phenomena [...]; what distinguishes the current era is 
their global salience”. Ethnic politics, therefore, is not a post-Cold War production; it 
has been present through different stages of history. At the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth century, ethnicity was undermined by “liberal 
expectancy” and “Marxist prediction”. The decolonisation movements in the “Third 
World” heralded the persistence of ethnic politics in international relations; but the 
dominance of the Cold War trivialised its significance at the time.   
 However, the phenomenon has become immitigably influential after the end 
of the Cold War. This explosion of ethnic politics, mostly in the form of ethnic 
conflict, put forth a new challenge for the International Relations discipline, to the 
degree that ethnic conflict was considered as the main characteristic of the “changing 
world system” (Gurr 1994; Smith 1981). In this regard, numerous analyses of various 
individual cases of ethnic conflict were conducted. Notwithstanding the significance 
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and contribution of those studies, they remained as individual case studies, 
theoretically disconnected and separated.  
 This thesis strived to argue that the phenomenon of ethnic politics is not 
sufficiently conceptualised and operationalised within the International Relations 
discipline yet. Studies of ethnic politics per se could not offer a celebrated theoretical 
framework. Further, ethnic politics is yet to be adequately incorporated in IR 
theories. 
 The main reason of the considerable neglect and theoretical lacunae in the 
discipline with regard to ethnic politics, this thesis argued, is seeing ethnicity as an 
ad hoc contingency that is irrelevant for international relations unless it turns into 
conflict and violence. The misnomer rubric “ethnic conflict” for studies of ethnic 
politics stands as the most obvious demonstration of the understanding of ethnicity in 
the discipline. This understanding is a legacy of the “liberal expectancy” and the 
“Marxist prediction”; and accordingly of “the Cold-War annexation of social 
sciences” (Bilgin and Morton 2002: 57). This approach mistakenly limits the nature 
of ethnicity and of ethnic politics to conflict.  
 However, ethnicity is a persistent reality and matters in international politics 
beyond conflict and violence. Ethnic groups, while they promote their 
national/communal causes, can perform influential politics that affect the domestic 
and foreign policies of states, and for that matter global politics in the international 
arena. These “ethnic politics” and their influence on the state and world politics need 
not to be necessarily conflictual. On the contrary, they can contribute to and promote 
non-conflictual politics.  
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6.2 Significance of the Volga Tatar Case and of Russia  
 The classical Marxist theory viewed national and ethnic identities as products 
of capitalism and predicted their end together with capitalism. However, Lenin‟s and 
Stalin‟s nationalities policies had to take ethnic identities seriously and 
contextualised them within Marxist theory. Therefore, the Soviet Union was not only 
formed as an ethno-territorial confederation; but its system also supported, 
consolidated, and even promoted new ethnic identities. As a result, the Soviet Union, 
as it shaped the world system during the Cold War, had the greatest share in shaping 
the persistence of ethnic politics in international relations. It is possible to argue that 
ethnicity could have still been considered as irrelevant to world politics without the 
Soviet experience.  
 The Eurasian landmass in general and the territories of the former Soviet 
Union in particular, has been a “paradise” of ethnic groups. Almost all of the ethnic 
groups/nationalities asserted their own national causes during perestroika. However, 
this thesis chose to analyse the Volga Tatars as a case study; since they represent a 
peculiar case in many respects.  
 First and foremost, the Volga Tatars had performed an exceptional national 
resilience and conducted an influential ethnic politics since their subjugation to 
Russian rule in 1552. Secondly, they did not choose to pursue a policy of fighting 
and separatism against Russians, in contrast to Caucasians, but at the same time they 
succeeded in preserving their national identity in a strong manner. Thirdly, and 
accordingly, they ended up in being the most critical ethnic group (Walker 1996) in 
the Russian Federation, by putting forward their own “Tatar Model” vis-a-vis 
Chechen separatism.  
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 All these characteristics of the Volga Tatars present a perfect case study for 
the general argument of this thesis. The Volga Tatar case demonstrates the 
significance of ethnicity beyond conflict. Tatarstan‟s quasi-independent foreign 
policy proves the direct influence of ethnic politics in international politics; and its 
promoting role in Turkish-Russian relations refutes the traditional argument that 
ethnicity is by nature conflictual.  
 Apart from that, this thesis attempted to conduct a historical analysis of the 
Volga Tatars with reference to their national resilience. Certain remarks and 
deductions that do not find a place in the literature are made as a result of this 
analysis.  
 First, in the literature the national causes of the Volga Tatars are generally 
analysed with reference to their religious persecution under the Russian rule. 
Notwithstanding that religion had a significant influence in the formation of the 
Volga Tatar identity; this thesis strived to argue that the national identity of the 
Volga Tatars is strictly tied with their historical role within the Turkic World. 
Accordingly, the ethnic politics they perform is significantly interdependent with 
those of other Turkic peoples.  
 Secondly, the mainstream literature on Jadidism tends to slight the role of the 
Jadidists on the socialist side of the political spectrum, most prominently Ayaz Ġshaki 
and Fuat Tuktar. The political activity of Sultangaliev before the Bolshevik 
Revolution, for that matter, remains unexamined. The political stand of those 
“dissident” Jadidists, however, represents the force and development of Volga Tatar 
national consciousness at the turn of the twentieth century. Further, their 
marginalisation by the mainstream Ittifak has a certain share in the relative 
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inefficiency of Tatar politics in the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik 
Revolution.  
 This thesis also strived to demonstrate the influence of ethnicity and ethnic 
politics in international relations by analysing the post-Soviet sovereignty project of 
Tatarstan. Tatarstan‟s emergence as the most powerful national republic in the 
Russian Federation without resorting to violence or harbouring separatism is a 
perfect example of the influence of ethnic politics in domestic politics of states. The 
foreign relations of Tatarstan that are analysed with respect to Turkish-Russian 
relations, on the other hand, prove that ethnicity and ethnic politics matter for 
international politics. Further, Tatarstan‟s place as a “promoting chapter” in Turkish-
Russian relations is an instance for the argument that ethnic politics in not limited to 
conflict and violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 
 
 
 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Abrahamian, Levon H. 2001. Civil Society Born in the Square: the Karabagh 
Movement in  Perspective. In The Making of Nagorno-Karabagh: From 
Secession to Republic,  edited by L. Chorbajian: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 
 
Akiner, Shirin. 1983. Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union. London and Boston: 
Kegan Paul International Ltd. 
 
Alexandre Bennigsen, S. Enders Wimbush. 1986. Muslims of the Soviet Union. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
 
 
Almond, Mark. 1996. Revolution: 500 Years of Struggle for Change: De Agostini 
Editions Ltd. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. 6th ed. London, New York: Verso. 
 
Bacon, Edwin. 2002. Brezhnev Reconsidered. In Brezhnev Reconsidered, edited by 
E. Bacon and M. Sandle: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 
 
Bahry, Donna. 2005. The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of Regional 
Sovereignty in  Russia. Comparative Politics 37 (2):127-146. 
 
Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, The Little, Brown Series in 
Anthropology. Boston: The Little, Brown and Company. 
 
 102 
 
Bayazitova, F. S. 1997. Kirashenner: Tel Üzencheleklare ham Yola İyjati. Kazan: 
Matbugat Yurti. 
 
Beissinger, Mark R. 2004. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bennigsen, Alexandre A., and S. Enders Wimbush. 1979. Muslim National 
Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial 
World. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Benson, Leslie. 1990. Partynomialism, Bureaucraticsm, and Economic Reform in the 
Soviet Power-System. Theory and Society 19 (1):87-105. 
 
Bilgin, Pinar, and David Morton. 2002. Historicising Representations of 'Failed 
States':  Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences? Third 
World Quarterly 23 (1):55-80. 
 
Bilgin, Pinar. 2010. Identity/Security. In The Routledge Handbook of New Security 
Studies,  edited by P. Burgess. London: Routledge. 
 
Billington, James H. 2004. Russia in Search of Itself. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press. 
 
Blitstein, Peter A. 2001. Nation-Building or Russification? Obligatory Russian 
Instruction in  the Soviet non-Russian Schools, 1938-1953. In A State of 
Nations: Empire and  Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin edited by 
R. G. Suny and T. Martin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bodansky, Yossef. 2007. Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda's Training Ground and the Next 
Wave of  Terror: HarperCollins. 
 
Breslauer, George W. 1992. Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 103 
 
Bukharaev, Ravil. 1999. The Model of Tatarstan: Under President Mintimer 
Shaimiev New  York: St. Martin's Press. 
 
Bukharaev, Ravil. 2007. Tatarstan: A 'Can-Do' Culture: President Mintimer 
Shaimiev and the Power of Common Sense. Folkstone Kent: Global Oriental. 
 
Bunce, Valerie. 1993. Domestic Reform and International Change: The Gorbachev 
Reforms in Historical Perspective. International Organization 47 (1):107-138. 
 
Cadiot, Juliette. 2005. Searching for Nationality: Statistics and National Categories at 
the End of the Russian Empire (1897-1917). Russian Review 64 (3):440-455. 
 
Carment, David. 1993. The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, 
Indicators, and Theory. Journal of Peace Research 30 (2):137-150. 
 
Carr, Edward Hallett. 1953. Stalin. Soviet Studies 5 (1):1-7 
 
Chafetz, Glenn. 1996-1997. The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet 
Russia. Political Science Quarterly 11 (4):661-688. 
 
 
Chenoy, Anuradha M. 1999. Variations of Russian Nationalism. In Nationalism in 
Russia and Central Asian Republics: Unfinished Democratic Revolution, 
edited by Shams-Ud-Din. New Delhi: Lancers Books. 
 
Connor, Walker. 1983. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and 
Strategy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Coppieters, Bruno, and Richard Sakwa, eds. 2003. Contextualizing Secession: 
Normative  Studies in Comparative Perspective. Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Cummings, Sally N., ed. 2002. Power and Change in Central Asia. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
 
 104 
 
Daulet, S. (2003). Kazan and Moscow: Five Centuries of Crippling Coexistence 
under Russian Imperialism (1552-2002). Hudson, New Hampshire: Kase 
Press. 
 
 
Çokay, Mustafa. 1988. 1917 Yılı Hatıra Parçaları. Ankara: YaĢ Türkistan NeĢriyatı. 
 
 
d‟Encausse, Helene Carrere. 1994. Social and Political Reform. In Central Asia: 130 
Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview edited by E. Allworth. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
 
Devlet, Nadir. 1985. Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi 1905-1917 Ankara: 
Türk Kültürünü AraĢtırma Enstitüsü. 
 
 
Devlet, Nadir. 1998. Rusya Türkiye ĠliĢkilerinde Tataristan Faktörü Var mı? In Türk 
Cumhuriyetleri ve Petrol Boru Hatları, edited by A. Yalçınkaya. Ġstanbul: 
Bağlam Yayınları.  
 
Devlet, Nadir. 1999. Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi 1905-1917 Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.  
 
 
Devlet, Nadir. 2005. The Ongoing Struggle between Moscow and Kazan and Its 
Implications for Democratization in Tatarstan. In Studies in the Politics, 
History, and Culture of Turkic Peoples, edited by N. Devlet. Ġstanbul: Yeditepe 
University. 
 
 
Devlet, Nadir. 2008. Moskova ile Kazan Arasındaki Mücadele ve Bunun 
Tataristan'da DemokratikleĢme Sürecine Yansıması. In Yirmi Birinci Yüzyılda 
İdil-Ural, edited by G. Pultar. Ankara: Tetragon. 
 
 
DevletĢin, Tamurbek. 1981. Sovyet Tataristanı. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası. 
 
 
Esman, Milton J. 1994. Ethnic Politics. New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
 
Evangelista, Matthew. 2002. The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the 
Soviet Union? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
 105 
 
Fowkes, Ben. 2002. The National Question in the Soviet Union under Lenoid 
Brezhnev: Policy and Response. In Brezhnev Reconsidered, edited by E. Bacon 
and M. Sandle: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher 
Limited. 
 
Giuliano, Elise. 2000. Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-
Determination? Identity and Preference Formation in Tatarstan's Nationalist 
Mobilization. Comparative Politics 32 (3):295-316. 
 
 
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. 1975. Ethnicity: Theory and 
Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Goode, J. Paul. 2007. The Puzzle of Putin's Gubernatorial Appointments. Europe-
Asia Studies 59 (3):365-399. 
 
Gorbachev, Mikhail. 2000. On My Country and the World. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Gorenburg, Dmitry P. 2003. Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation. 
 Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Gorenburg, Dmitry. 2004. The View of Russian Electoral Reforms from Russia‟s 
Ethnic  Republics. PONARS Policy Memo 338. 
 
Govers, Cora, and Hans Vermeulen, eds. 1997. The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness. 
 Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Graney, Katherine E. 2009. Of Khans and Kremlis: Tatarstan and the Future of 
Ethno- Federalism in Russia. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
 
Groth, Alexander J., and Stuart Britton. 1993. Gorbachev and Lenin: Psychological 
Walls of the Soviet "Garrison State". Political Psychology 14 (4):627-650. 
 
 106 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical 
Conflicts: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1994. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Edited by G. A. Lopez, 
Dilemmas in World Politics. Boulder San Francisco Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1994. Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the 
Changing  World System: 1994 Presidential Address. International 
Studies Quarterly 38 (3):347-377. 
 
Haas, Ernst B. 1986. Review: What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it? 
 International Organization 40 (3):707-744. 
 
Hablemitoğlu, Necip. 1997. Çarlık Rusyası'nda Türk Kongreleri (1905-1917) 
Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi. 
 
Hahn, Gordon M. 2003. The Past, Present , and Future of the Russian Federal State. 
 Demokratizatsiya. 
 
Hale, Henry E. 2005. The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia 
Survives Where the USSR Fell. Perspectives on Politics 3 (1):55-70. 
 
Hale, Henry E. 2008. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and 
Nations in Eurasia and the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hayit, Baymirza. 1997. Basmacılar Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı.  
 
 
 
Hobsbawm, H. J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality. Second Edition ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hobson, John M. 2003. The State and International Relations. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 107 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1971. Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics. World Politics 23 
(2):232- 244. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press. 
 
Huttenbach, Henry R. 198. Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 
1552-56. In Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, edited by M. Rywkin. 
London and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited. 
 
 
Ilgar, Ġhsan. 1990. Rusya'da Birinci Müslüman Kongresi. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları. 
 
 
Ġnalcık, Halil. 2008. Kazan Hanlığı Nasıl DüĢtü: Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Doğu Avrupa'da 
Egemenlik Mücadelesi. In Yirmi Birinci Yüzyılda İdil-Ural, edited by G. Pultar. 
Ankara: Tetragon. 
 
 
Jersild, Austin. 1999. Rethinking Russia from Zardob: Hasan Melikov Zardabi and 
the "Native" Intelligentsia. Nationalities Papers 27 (3):503-517. 
 
 
Kagarlitsky, Boris. 2002. Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-Liberal Autocracy. 
London: Pluto Press. 
 
Kahn, Jeffrey. 2002. Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia. 
Oxford,  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kamalov, Ġlyas. 2008. Türkiye-Tataristan ĠliĢkileri. Stratejik Analiz 9 (98):80-85. 
 
Karasar, Hasan Ali, and Sanat K. KuĢkumbayev. 2009. Türkistan Bütünleşmesi: 
Merkezi  Asya'da Birlik Arayışları. Ġstanbul, Ankara: Ötüken NeĢriyat. 
 
Kaushik, Devendra. 1999. The Anatomy of Russian Nationalism in Post-Soviet 
Period. In Nationalism in Russia and Central Asian Republics: Unfinished 
Democratic Revolution, edited by Shams-Ud-Din. New Delhi: Lancers Books. 
 
 108 
 
Kean, Margaret, ed. 2005. John Milton's Paradise Lost: A Sourcebook. New York: 
 Routledge. 
 
Keep, J. L. H. 1955. Russian Social-Democracy and the First State Duma. The 
Slavonic and East European Review 34 (82). 
 
 
Kempton, Daniel R. 1996. The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The Evolution of 
Centre- Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation. Europe-Asia Studies 48 
(4):587-613. 
 
Khudiakov, Mihail. 1991. Ocherki po Istorii Kazanskogo Khanstva. Moscow: Ġnsan. 
 
 
Kotkin, Stephen. 1991. Steeltown, USSR: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
 
Kramer, Heinz. 1996. Will Central Asia Become Turkey's Sphere of Influence. 
Centre for Strategic Research 1(6). 
 
 
Kremenyuk, Victor A. 1994. Conflicts In and Around Russia: Nation-Building in 
Difficult Times. Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press. 
 
Kulavig, Erik. 2002. Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev: Nine Stories about 
Disobedient Russians. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Latter, Richard. 1993. Internal Security in Russia and its Regions. In Russia and its 
Regions: Can the Centre Hold? London: Wilton Park. 
 
Lazzerini, Edward J. 1981. Tatarovedenie and The "New Historiography" In the 
Soviet  Union: Revising the Interpretation of the Tatar-Russian Relationship. 
Slavic Review 40(4): 624-635. 
 
 
Lazzerini, Edward J. 1982. Ethnicity and the Uses of History: The Case of the Volga 
Tatars and Jadidism. Central Asian Survey 1 (2-3):61-69. 
 
 109 
 
 
Lenin, V.I. 1966. Collected Works: 1900-1923. Vol. 36. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers. 
 
Lepgold, Joseph, and Miroslav Nincic. 2001. Beyond the Ivory Tower: International 
Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance. New York: 
ColumbiaUniversity Press. 
 
Lobell, Steven E., and Philip Mauceri, eds. 2004. Ethnic Conflict and International 
Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave  Macmillan. 
 
Martin, Janet. 1990. The Novokscheny o Novgorod: Assimilation in the 16th 
Century. Central Asian Survey 9(2): 13-38. 
 
Martin, Terry. 2001. An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the 
Highest Form  of Imperialism. In A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-
Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, edited by R. G. Suny and T. Martin. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
McCann, Leo. 2005. Economic Development in Tatarstan: Global markets and a 
Russian  Region. London and New York: RoutledgeCruzon. 
 
 
McFaul, Michael. 1997. A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of 
Russian  Foreign Policy. International Security 22 (3):5-35. 
 
McLoughlin, Barry, and Kevin McDermott, eds. 2003. Stalin's Terror: High Politics 
and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union. London: Plagrave Macmillan. 
 
Medish,Vadim, ed. 1997. My Russia: The Political Autobiography of Gennady 
Zyuganov. London, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
 
 
Medvedev, Roy. 2000. Post-Soviet Russia: A Journey through the Yeltsin Era. 
Columbia University Press: New York. 
 
 110 
 
Mende, Gerhard von. 2004. Ġsmail Bey Gasprinskiy: Rusya Türklerinin Milli 
Faaliyetleri Hakkında In İsmail Bey Gaspıralı İçin, edited by H. Kırımlı. 
Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve YarımlaĢma Derneği. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. 2009 [1861]. Considerations on Representative Government: The 
Floating Press. 
 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2003. Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific 
Assessment. In Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the 
Field, edited by C. Elman and M. F. Elman. Cambrigde: MIT Press. 
 
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1993. Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. 
Oxford,  New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nove, Alec. 1992. Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Olcott, Martha B. 1981. The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24. 
Soviet Studies 33 (3). 
 
 
Payin, Emil. 1995. Separatism and Federalism in Contemporary Russia. In Remaking 
Russia:  Voices from Within, edited by H. Isham. New York, London: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
 
Payne, Matt. 2001. The Forge of the Kazakh Proletariat? The Turksib, Nativization, 
and Industrialization during Stalin's Five Year Plan. In A State of Nations: 
Empire and  Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, edited by R. G. 
Suny and T. Martin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Petrov, Nikolai. 2002. Seven Faces of Putin‟s Russia: Federal Districts as the New 
Level of State–Territorial Composition. Security Dialogue 33 (1):73–91. 
 
Petrov, Nikolai, and Darrell Slider. 2005. Putin and the Regions. In Putin's Russia: 
Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, edited by D. R. Herspring. New York, 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
 111 
 
Pipes, Richard. 1954. The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and 
Nationalism 1917-1923 Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
 
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. 1977. Ethnicity in the Soviet Union. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 433 (Ethnic Conflict in the 
World Today):73-87. 
 
Ree, Erik van. 2003. The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin. London and New York: 
 RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Remington, Thomas F. 2003. Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation 
Council  since 2000. Europe-Asia Studies 55 (5):667-691. 
 
Reminick, Ronald A. 1983. Theory of Ethnicity: An Anthropologist's Perspective. 
Lanham  New York London: University Press of America. 
 
Rex, John. 1959. The Plural Society in Sociological Theory. The British Journal of 
Sociology 10 (2):114-124. 
 
Reynolds, Michael A. 2011. Shattering Empires:The Clash of the Ottoman and 
Russian  Empires, 1908-1918 New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Riggs, Fred W. 1994. Ethnonationalism, Industrialism, and the Modern State. Third 
World Quarterly 15 (4):583-611. 
 
Ro‟i, Yaachov. 1984. The Task of Creating the New Soviet Man: 'Atheistic 
Propaganda' in the Soviet Muslim Areas. Soviet Studies 36 (1). 
 
 
Roberts, Glenn L. 2007. Commissar and Mullah: Soviet-Muslim Policy from 1917 to 
1924. Florida: Dissertation.Com. 
 
 
Rorlich, Azade-Ayse. 1974. Which Way Will Tatar Culture Go? A controversial 
Essay by Galimdzhan Ibragimov. Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 15 (3-
4):363-371. 
 
 112 
 
 
Rorlich, Azade-AyĢe. 1982. Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims. 
Central Asian Survey 1 (1):5-42. 
 
 
 
Rorlich, Azade-AyĢe. 1986. The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience. 
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 
 
 
Rorlich, Azade-AyĢe. 2000. Idel Tatarları: Milli Çıdamlıgına Tarihi Karaş. 
Moscow: Insan  Publishing House. 
 
 
Roshwald, Aviel. 2001. Ethnic Nationalism and The Fall of Empires: Central 
Europe, Russia  and The Middle East, 1914-1923. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
 
Roth, Guenther, and Claus Wittich, eds. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of 
California Press. 
 
Ryan, Stephen. 1990. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Dartmouth: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company.  
 
Sakwa, Richard, and Mark Webber. 1999. The Commonwealth of Independent 
States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival. Europe-Asia Studies 51 (3):379-
415. 
 
 
Sakwa, Richard. 2008. Putin: Russia's Choice. London, New York: Routledge. 
 
Sanborn, Joshua. 2001. Family, Fraternity, and Nation-Building in Russia, 1905-
1925. In A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Building in the Age of Lenin 
and Stalin, edited by R. G. Suny and T. Martin. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Schamiloglu, Uli. 1990. The Formation of a Tatar Historical Consciousness: 
Sihabeddin Mercani and the Image of Golden Horde. Central Asian Survey 9 
(2):39-49. 
 
 
 113 
 
Schweller, Randall L. 2004. Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of 
 Underbalancing. International Security 29 (2):159–201. 
 
Selbach, Christopher. 2001. The Volga Tatars under Russian Domination. 
Norderstedt Germany: GRIN Verlag. 
 
Sevcenko, Ihor. 1967. Muscovy's Conquest of Kazan: Two Views Reconciled. Slavic 
Review 26 (4):541-547. 
 
 
Seydahmet, Kırımlı Cafer. 1934. Gaspıralı İsmail Bey. Ġstanbul: Türk Anonim 
ġirketi. 
 
 
Sezer, Duygu Baloğlu. 2001. Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical 
Competition with Economic Partnership. In Turkey in World Politics: An 
Emerging Multiregional Power, edited by B. M. R. K. KiriĢçi. Colorado and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
 
 
Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2003. Paradiplomacy in the Russian Regions: Tatarstan's 
Search for Statehood. Europe-Asia Studies 55 (4):613-629. 
 
 
Shaw, Denis J. B. 1999. Russia in the Modern World: A New Geography. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
 
 
Slezkine, Yuri. 1994. The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State 
 Promoted Ethnic Particularism. Slavic Review 53 (2):414-452. 
 
Slocum, John W. 1998. Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the 
Category of "Aliens" in Imperial Russia. Russian Review 57 (2):173-190. 
 
 
 
Smith, Anthony D. 1981. The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. New York: 
 Cambrdige University Press. 
 
 
Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 
 
 
 114 
 
Smith, Hayden. 1999. Will Russia Break Apart? New Zeland International Review 
24 (1). 
 
Smith, Jeremy. 2005. The Fall of Soviet Communism 1985-91: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Starovoitova, Galina. 1995. Modern Russia and the Ghost of Weimar Germany. In 
Remaking Russia: Voices from Within, edited by H. Isham. London, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Stone, David R. 2006. A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the 
War in Chechnya. Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International. 
 
Stone, Norman. 1998. The Eastern Front 1914-1917. London, New York: Penguin 
Books. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1999-2000. Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in 
Post-Soviet Eurasia. International Security 24 (3):139-178. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. 2001. Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of 
Empire. In A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin 
and Stalin edited by R. G. Suny and T. Martin. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigory, and Terry Martin. 2001. Introduction. In A State of Nations: 
Empire  and Nation-Making  in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, edited by R. G. 
Suny and T. Martin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigory, ed. 2006. The Cambridge History of Russia: The Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore 
and Sao Paulo: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Suny, Ronald Grigory. 2001. The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, "National 
Identity", and Theories of Empire. In A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-
Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, edited by R. G. Suny and T. Martin. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 115 
 
Tahirov, Idris. 2005. Baysezlek Yolinda. Miras. 
 
 
Taymas, A. Battal. 1958. Kazanlı Türk Meşhurlarından Rizaeddin Fahreddinoğlu. 
Istanbul: Birlik Basın ve Yayın Evi. 
 
 
Taymas, A. Battal. 1959. Kazanlı Türk Meşhurlarından İki Maksudiler. Ġstanbul: 
Sıralar Matbaası. 
 
 
Tellal, Erel. 2001. Mirsaid Sultan Galiev. Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 56 
(1):105-133. 
 
 
Teschke, Benno. 2003. The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of 
Modern  International Relations. London, New York: Verso. 
 
Tishkov, Valery. 2004. Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press. 
 
Togan, Zeki Velidi. 2003. Başkurtların Tarihi Ankara: Yücel Ofset. 
 
 
Tolkien, J.R.R. 2002 [1954]. The Fellowship of the Ring: Being the First Part of The 
Lord of the Rings: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
 
Tolz, Vera. 2001. Inventing the Nation: Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tolz, Vera. 2004. The Search for a National Identity in the Russia of Yeltsin and 
Putin. In Restructuring Post-Communist Russia, edited by Y. Brundy, J. 
Frankel and S. Hoffman. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York. 
 
Tompson, W. J. 1993. Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison. 
British Journal of Political Science 23 (1):77-105. 
 
Torbakov, Igor. 2007. Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian 
Relations. edited by T. J. Foundation. 
 
Treisman, Daniel S. 1997. Russia's "Ethnic Revival": The Separatist Activism of 
Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order. World Politics 49 (2):212-249. 
 116 
 
 
Turnerelli, Edward Tracy. 2005 [1854]. Kazan: The Ancient Capital of the Tartar 
Khans, Elibron Classics Series. London: Adamant Media Corporation. 
 
 
Uehling, Greta Lynn. 2004. Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and 
Return: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Viola, Lynne. 1996. Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of 
Peasant Resistance. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1998. Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first 
Century. New York: The New York Press. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International 
Security 25 (1):5-41. 
 
Warhola, James W., and William A. Mitchell. 2006. The Warming of Turkish-
Russian Relations: Motives and Implications. Demokratizatsiya 14 (1). 
 
Weir, David M. Kotz with Fred. 1997. Revolution from Above: The Demise of the 
Soviet System. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Werth, Paul W. 2000. From "Pagan" Muslims to "Baptized" Communists: Religious 
Conversion and Ethnic Particularity in Russia's Eastern Provinces. 
Comparative  Studies in Society and History 42 (3):497-523. 
 
 
Williams, Christopher. 2011. Tatar Nation-Building since 1991: Ethnic Mobilisation 
in Historical Perspective. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in 
Europe 10 (1):94–123. 
 
 
Wood, Alen. 1992. Introduction. In The White Army edited by G. A. I. Denikin. 
Cambridge: Ian Faulkner Publishing. 
 
 
Yemelianova, Galina M. 1988. Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 117 
 
 
Yemelianova, Galina M. 1999. Volga Tatars, Russians and the Russian State at the 
Turn of  the Nineteenth Century: Relationships and Perceptions. The Slavonic 
and East European Review 77 (3):448-484. 
 
 
 
Young, Crawford. 1983. Review: The Temple of Ethnicity. World Politics 35 
(4):652-662 
 
Zenkovsky, Serge A. 1953. A Century of Tatar Revival. American Slavic and East 
European Review 12 (3). 
 
 
Zimonyi, I. (1990). The Origins of the Volga Bulghars. Szeged: Studia Uralo-
Altaica. 
 
 
Zisserman-Brodsky, Dina. 2003. Constructing Ethnic Politics in the Soviet Union: 
Samizdat, Deprivation, and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Zverev, Alexei. 2003. Special Status for Tatarstan: Validity of Claims and Limits on 
Sovereignty. In Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative 
Perspective, edited by B. Coppieters and R. Sakwa. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford  University Press. 
 
 
Internet Sources 
 
Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Tatarstan. 27 September 2011. 
http://en.speaker.tatarstan.ru/> 
 
Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. 10 October 2011. 
http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/politics/dfa/sover/cons8.htm> 
 
Cumhuriyet. 27 September 2011. Erdoğan: Farklı Gayeler içinde Değiliz available 
at http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?kn=8&hn=225650> 
 
Official Tatarstan. 15 May 2011. http://tatarstan.ru/eng/about/state.htm> 
 118 
 
 
President of the Republic of Tatarstan. 27 September 2011. 
http://president.tatarstan.ru/eng> 
 
RFE/RL. 21 May 2011. Tatar President Criticizes Putin Reform Plans available at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055525.html> 
 
Rusya‟nın Sesi. 27 September 2011. Tataristan Türkiye ile Rusya arasındaki 
Köprüdür available at http://turkish.ruvr.ru/2011/05/30/51007595.html> 
 
Tatarstan Trade House. 15 May 2011. http://www.tatartrade.com> 
 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti CumhurbaĢkanlığı. 27 September 2011. Tataristan Parlamento 
Başkanı Çankaya Köşkü’nde available at 
http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/79937/tataristan-cumhuriyeti-parlamento-
baskani-cankaya-koskunde.html> 
 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti DıĢiĢleri Bakanlığı. 27 September 2011. Türkiye-Rusya 
Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-
federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa> 
 
United Nations. 4 October 2011.  UN Special Adviser on Sport strenghtens 
cooperation with Russian authorities ahead of 2013 Universiade and 2014 Winter 
Olympic Games available at 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/sport/home/unplayers/special_adviser/template/
news_item.jsp?cid=26800> 
 
Walker, Edward W. 20 May 2011. The Dog That Didn't Bark: Tatarstan and 
Asymmetrical Federalism in Russia. available at 
http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/politics/dfa/f_media/tatar.htm> 
 
 
 
 
 
 119 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
TATARSTAN’S DECLARATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
Declaration On the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan 
The Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Social Republic, 
-realising the historical responsibility for the fortunes of multinational peoples; 
-expressing respect to sovereign rights of all the peoples, inhabiting the Russian 
Federation and USSR; 
-realising the incapability of the status of the Autonomous Republic, and the interests 
of the future political, economic, social and spiritual development of the 
multinational peoples; 
-ensuring the inherent rights of Tatars, of the whole population of the Republic to 
self-determination; 
-aiming at the creation of legal democratic state, 
1.Proclaims Tatar state sovereignty and reforms the Autonomous Republic into the 
Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic - The Republic of Tatarstan. 
2.The land, its natural resources and other resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR 
are the exclusive property of Tatar people. 
3.Irrespective of nationality, social origin, belief, political convictions and other 
differences, Tatar SSR guarantees all the citizens of the Republic equal rights and 
freedoms. Russian and Tatar are the state languages and are equal in the Tatar SSR, 
the maintenance and development of the languages of other nationalities are ensured. 
4.In the future the official state name in the Constitution and in other legal acts and in 
state activity is "Tatar Soviet Social Republic" ("Tatar SSR" or "The Republic of 
Tatarstan"). 
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The Republic's Supreme body of power shall be named "The Supreme Soviet of the 
Tatar SSR" and its enacting acts shall be named the acts of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Tatar SSR. 
5.The present declaration is the basis for the creation of the Tatar SSR Constitution, 
for the development of the Tatar legislation, for the collaboration of the Tatar SSR in 
the creation and signing the Union Treaty, for agreements with the Russian 
Federation and other republics, for the presentation of the most important questions 
of the formation of the Tatar SSR and its relations with USSR, the Russian 
Federation and other republics for the consideration of its people. 
The Constitution and the acts of the Tatar SSR shall be supreme on the territory of 
the Tatar SSR. 
6.Before the adoption of the new Constitution of the Tatar SSR, other acts and 
normative documents of the Tatar SSR on the territory of the Tatar SSR, the acts of 
the Tatar SSR, the Russian Federation and the USSR, unless they contradict the 
Declaration on the state sovereignty of the Tatar SSR, remain valid. 
The present Declaration is valid since the date of its adoption. 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Soviet Social Republic 
M.SHAIMIYEV  
Kazan, August 30,1990 
 
Retrieved on 10 October 2011 from 
http://www.kcn.ru/tat_en/politics/dfa/sover/decl1.htm> 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
THE POWER-SHARING TREATY OF 1994 
 
 
Treaty on Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Powers between Bodies of 
Public Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of 
the Republic of Tatarstan 
Bodies of public authority of the Russian Federation and bodies of public authority 
of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
Governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Tatarstan, federal laws, and laws of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
Taking into consideration the experience of applying the Treaty between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan "On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects 
and Mutual Delegation of Powers between Bodies of Public Authority of the Russian 
Federation and Bodies of Public Authority of the Republic of Tatarstan" dated the 
15th of February 1994, concluded on the basis of the referendum in the Republic of 
Tatarstan held on the 21st of March 1992 and in accordance with the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
Proceeding from historical, cultural, economic, environmental and other specific 
features of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
have agreed on the following: 
Article1 
Delimitation of jurisdictional subjects and powers between bodies of public authority 
of the Russian Federation and bodies of public authority of the Republic of Tatarstan 
is effected by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Tatarstan, and this Treaty. 
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Article 2 
1. In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution 
of the Republic of Tatarstan, the Republic of Tatarstan (a state) - a constituent entity 
of the Russian Federation - possesses full state authority beyond the competence of 
the Russian Federation and powers of the Russian Federation concerning the matters 
within the joint competence of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation. 
2. Taking into consideration that the use and protection of land, subsurface resources, 
water, forest and other natural resources in the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan 
constitute the basis of life and activity of its multinational people, the Government of 
the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan 
conclude agreements providing for the joint resolution of issues related to economic, 
environmental (resulting from the long use of oil deposits with account taken for the 
mining and geological conditions of hydrocarbons extraction), cultural and other 
specific features of the Republic of Tatarstan. The Government of the Russian 
Federation and the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan introduce the 
corresponding draft laws pertaining to issues mentioned in this clause to the State 
Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. 
3. The Republic of Tatarstan, within its competence, carries out international and 
foreign economic relations with constituent entities and administrative-territorial 
divisions of foreign states; participates in the activities of bodies of international 
organisations specially created for these purposes; as well as signs agreements for the 
implementation of international and foreign economic relations and carries out such 
communications with bodies of public authority of foreign states in coordination with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in accordance with the 
procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation. 
4. The Republic of Tatarstan, in coordination with the Government of the Russian 
Federation, provides state support and assistance to its compatriots in the 
preservation of the identity and in the development of national culture and language. 
5. State languages in the Republic of Tatarstan are the Russian and Tatar languages, 
the status and procedures of the use of which are determined by the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, federal law, 
and law of Republic Tatarstan. 
For nominees to fill the supreme official position of the Republic of Tatarstan 
introduced in accordance with the procedure stipulated by federal law, an additional 
requirement is established, providing for the competence in the state languages of the 
Republic of Tatarstan. The competence in the state languages of the Republic of 
Tatarstan is established in a declarative way. 
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Article 3 
The citizens of the Russian Federation residing in the territory of the Republic of 
Tatarstan have the right to obtain the main document proving their identity (a regular 
passport of the citizen of the Russian Federation) with an inserted page in the state 
language of the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatar) and with the State Emblem of the 
Republic of Tatarstan. 
Article 4 
The bodies of public authority of the Republic of Tatarstan have a corresponding 
representative office under the President of the Russian Federation in Moscow. 
Article 5 
1. Validity of this Treaty is 10 years from the date of its coming into force. 
2. The procedure of renewal of this Treaty, as well as the procedure and the grounds 
of its early termination (cancellation) are determined by federal law. 
Article 6 
Done in Moscow on the 26th of June 2007 in two copies, each in the Tatar and the 
Russian languages, with both texts having equal validity. 
 
Retrieved on 10 October 2011 from http://1997-
2011.tatarstan.ru/?DNSID=09833d9662858febeee12683bbde3ce0&node_id=813> 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
THE SPEECH OF AHMET DAVUTOĞLU, MINISTER OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF TURKEY, ON TATAR NATIONAL POET ABDULLAH 
TUKAY 
 
 
Tataristan CumhurbaĢkanlığı temsilcisi sayın Timur Bey, sayın Büyükelçi, 
Tataristan‟dan gelen dostlarımız, kardeĢlerimiz, Türkiye‟nin seçkin aydınları; 
Ben her Ģeyden önce hepinize Cumhuriyet‟imizin kalbi, ilk Büyük Millet 
Meclisi binamızın hemen karĢısında, Ankara Palas‟ta, sizi misafir etmekten 
duyduğum onuru ifade etmek istiyorum ve hepinize tekrar hoĢgeldiniz diyorum.  
Büyük Ģahsiyetleri düĢünmek, sadece onların hayatlarını ya da onların 
yazdıklarını düĢünmek değildir. Aslına büyük Ģahsiyetleri düĢünmek üzerinden biz, 
bir tarih ve mekan muhasebesi de yaparız. Abdullah Tukay böyle bir Ģahsiyet. Ben 
bundan 3 sene önce, Ġslam Konferansı Örgütü Gençlik Forumu‟nun davetlisi olarak, 
Kazan‟a gittiğimde, aslında sadece bir toplantıya katılmak niyetiyle gitmedim. Hep 
merak ettiğim bir mekanı, hep merak ettiğim bir çevreyi, bizzat teneffüs etmek, 
bizzat oralarda yürümek, o toprakları hissetmek için gittim. Nedendi bu merak? 
Çünkü tarihte çok az görülen mucizeli iki geliĢmenin soruları zihnimde hep yer 
almıĢtı. Bir, mekanla ilgili olarak; iki, tarihi dönemle ilgili olarak; üç, Abdullah 
Tukay‟ın Ģahsiyetiyle ilgili olarak.  
 Mekanla ilgili olarak zihnimdeki sual Ģuydu: O engin Avrasya stepleri 
genellikle göçebe kavimlerin büyük akınlarının coğrafyası olarak, çok az kültürün 
kökleĢtiği, kültürlerin genellikle akıp gittiği bir coğrafyayı oluĢturmuĢtu. Bunun bir 
istisnası vardı: Kazan. Kazan kökleĢmiĢ bir mekanın simge ismiydi benim zihnimde. 
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Birçok kavimler geçti o Avrasya steplerinden, Volga boylarından. Ama çok az kavim 
bir mekanı  yurt edip, o mekanda 1000 yılı aĢkın bir kültürü nesilden nesile bütün 
zorluklara rağmen aktarabildi. Bu, Tatar kültürünün ne kadar köklü olduğunun bir 
iĢaretidir. Ben bunu anlamak istedim her Ģeyden önce. Hangi dinamiklerdi ki, birçok 
imparatorlukların, birçok göçüĢlerin, göçlerin yaĢandığı bu coğrafyada, köklü bir 
medeniyeti, bir medeniyet merkezini inĢa edebilmiĢti.  
 Ġkinci olarak, yine bu mekanda merak ettiğim husus Ģuydu: Birçok merkezler 
var. Farklı medeniyetlerin hesaplaĢmasını yapmıĢ olan, çok farklı kültürle yüzleĢmiĢ 
olan. Ama çok yoğun bir dönemde o derece yoğun bir kültür hareketi yaĢamıĢ olan 
çok az mekan vardır Kazan gibi, Tataristan gibi.  Bu bahsettiğim dönem de, 1000 
yıllık dönem içinde, özellikle 19. yüzyılın sonları ve 20. yüzyılın baĢları. O dönemin 
durumunu iyi anlamak lazım. O dönem birçok millet için otantik kültürler için, Ġslam 
toplumları için, Türk topulukları için, Hintliler için, Çinliler için, herkes için 
BatılılaĢma, modernleĢme ve bir hesaplaĢma dönemiydi. SömürgeleĢmenin 
yaygınlaĢtığı bir dönemde, birçok aydın kendi kimliğini aradı.  
 Ama çok az yerde ceditçilik hareketinin yaptığı etkiye benzer Ģekilde, bir 
bölgeye, bir Ģehre, bir yere teksif edilmiĢ Ģekilde bu derece yoğun bir kültür 
hareketliliği görülmüĢtür. Bu kültür hareketliliği sadece o bölgeye de münhasır 
kalmamıĢtır. Kazan‟da yetiĢen büyük Ģahsiyetler, neredeyse bir keĢif hareketine 
çıkıyormuĢ gibi, kendi kültürlerini muhafaza etme yanında, Batı kültürünü, Rus 
kültürünü yakından tanıma, ayrıca büyük seferlere çıkma cesaretini gösterdiler. 
Abdullah Tukay eğer uzun yaĢamıĢ olsaydı, muhtemelen o da aynı sefere çıkardı.  
Ama sadece bir örneği vererek sizi pekiĢtireyim. Hepimizin bildiği Yusuf 
Akçura. Kitabı Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset‟i Kazan‟da yazdı. O kitap 1905‟te Kahire‟de 
basıldı, ama en çok Ġstanbul‟da, Ankara‟da okundu. ġimdi düĢünün: Kazan‟la 
Kahire‟yi ortak kılan bugün ne kadar Ģey kaldı? Kazan‟da yazılan hangi kitap 
Kahire‟de basılıyor ve Türkiye‟de aynı yoğunlukta okunabiliyor? KüreselleĢme 
yaĢıyoruz, değil mi? Ġnternet var. Ama ben bir profesor olarak, öğretim üyesi olarak 
soruyorum kendime: Çok az Tatarstanlı, Tatar, Kazanlı öğrencim olabildi. Gerçekten 
buna da hayıflanıyorum. Ama Yusuf Akçura‟nın oldu. Türk öğrencileri oldu, 
kitapları Kahire‟de okutuldu. 
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 Yine dönemin ruhunu anlamak bakımından, hangi insan AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim 
gibi, neredeyse heybesini alıp sırtına bütün Avrasya‟yı dolaĢır? Hangi güç, hagi 
motivasyon onu Asya‟nın içlerinden Uzakdoğu‟ya kadar götürdü? Çünkü çok basit 
bir Ģeyi vardı AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim‟in, Yusuf Akçura‟nın, Musa Carullah‟ın ve tabi 
Abdullah Tukay‟ın: kendilerinden emindiler.  Hangi kültür havzasına ait olduklarının 
farkındaydılar ve Ģunu düĢünüyorlardı: Asırlarca kökleĢtikleri, köklü bir Ģekilde 
yaĢadıkları kültürün dünyaya vereceği bir mesaj var. O dili yaymanın, o kültürü 
yaymanın bir evrensel mesajı da var. Yerellikle evrensellik arasında dengeyi 
kuramamıĢ hiçbir aydın, hiçbir aydın grubu, geceleğe birĢey aktaramaz. Eğer kendi 
milli bilincinizi, tarih bilincinizi, ve kimliğinizi muhafaza edememiĢseniz, ne kadar 
dolaĢırsanız dolaĢın sadece gezgin olursunuz. Eğer değiĢik kültürlere açılmayı 
düĢünememiĢseniz, kendi kültürünüzü ne kadar muhafaza ederseniz edin yerel 
kalırsınız, lokal kalırsınız.  
 Kazan bugün belki dünyanın en büyük Ģehirleri arasında değil. Ama Kazan 
öyle bir mekan ki, Tolstoy orada okumuĢ. Sadece Yusuf Akçura‟lar, AbdurreĢid 
Ġbrahim‟ler, Abdullah Tukay‟lar değil. Tolstoy‟a mekan olmuĢ. 1804‟te Kazan 
Devlet Üniversitesi kurulmuĢ. Sadece Tolstoy‟a mı, Lenin‟e de mekan olmuĢ. Sosyal 
hareketliliğin herĢeyini yaĢamıĢ, kültür hareketliliğini yaĢamıĢ, doğuyu batıyla, 
Türkü Rusla buluĢturmuĢ bir mekan Kazan. Onun için Kazan‟ın ruhunu keĢfetmek 
lazım.  
 Ben 3 sene önce Sabantuy Ģenlikleri için oraya gittiğimde, hem kendi 
atalarımın büyük serüvenini, Avrasya‟dan girip Asya derinliklerinden Toroslara 
gelen serüvenini, anlamaya çalıĢtım; hem kendimi de ait gördüğüm bir aydın 
geleneğinin ne kadar köklü bir birikimle insanlığa kısa bir dönemde ne kadar büyük 
Ģeyler sunduğunu farkettim. Benim rahmetli babaannem vardı. Bizim Toros dağları, 
Türkmen kültürünün çok katıksız Ģekliyle yaĢadığı nadir mekanlardır, bizim oralar, 
ağıtlarıyla Ģiirleriyle. Babaannem durur durur tekrar ederdi: Horasan‟dır bizim ilimiz/ 
Ġsfahan‟dan geçti yolumuz. Ondan sonra da devam ederdi. Sorsanız coğrafya bilgisi 
yok mübarek kadının, irfanı kuvvetli değil.  Erdemi büyük ve benim Ģahsiyetim 
üzerinde büyük etkisi var. Annemin vefatı sonrasında özellikle elinde büyüdüğüm 
için. Ama dualarıyla, ağıtlarıyla hala kulağımda. Ama eminim Horasan‟ı bilmiyordu. 
Eminim Ġsfahan‟ı da bilmiyordu. Ama bir topluluk, o büyük güç, Hazar‟ın ve 
Karadeniz‟in güneyinde yaĢadı, bizler gibi. Bir baĢka topluluk da kuzeyinde yaĢadı, 
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Tatarlar gibi. Ve o toplulukların kaderleri bir dönemde birleĢti. Yusuf Akçura‟nın 
yaptığı etki gibi, AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim‟in Mehmet Akif‟in ruh dünyasına nüfuz etmesi 
gibi. Mehmet Akif‟in Safahat‟ında kimi zaman AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim‟in, kimi zaman 
Abdullah Tukay‟ın Ģiirindeki izleri bulursunuz. Ve öylesine bir etkileĢim ki, bizim 
Ģimdi ders almamız gereken bir etkileĢim. Gittikçe küçülen, gittikçe daralan dünyada, 
onlar, Doğu‟yu Batı‟yla, Türk‟ü Rus‟la buluĢturdular.  
 ġimdi bu mekan, Kazan, ne bu tarihi dilim, 1886-1913, Abdullah Tukay için, 
Yusuf Akçura için daha uzun, AbdurreĢid Ġbrahim için daha farklı. Ama 1880li 
yıllarda doğanların meydan okumasıdır bu. Gazi Mustafa Kemal gibi, Mehmet Akif 
gibi. Yazın bunları arka arkaya, bir büyük arayıĢın izlerini bulursunuz. Abdullah 
Tukay, çok kısa hayatına, 26 yıllık hayatına, iĢte bütün bu dediğim Ģeyleri sığdırdı. 
Sanki ait olduğu 1000 yıllık kültürün bütün yükünü üzerinde taĢıyordu, bütün 
sorumluluğunu, güzelliğini. KarĢı karĢıya kaldığı, içinde yaĢadığı bu kültür 
atmosferinin bütün özelliklerine nüfuz etmeye çalıĢıyordu. Türk, Rus, Arap, Fars 
edebiyatını, Fransız edebiyatını tanımıĢtı çok daha genç yaĢta. Ve dilinin farkındaydı, 
dilini kullanıyordu. ġiir yazarken sadece bir edebi eser yazmanın ötesinde bir neslin 
ağıtını yazıyordu. Bir Tatar destanı yazıyordu bir açıdan da. Ve sahip olduğu kültürü 
her yere aktaracak bir bilinç taĢıyordu.  
 Geleneği taĢıyordu çünkü bildiğimiz kadarıyla 7 kuĢağa kadar ailesi imamdı. 
KuĢaklar önemli, nesillerden nesillere aktarılan kültür bakımından.  Dolayısıyla, 
Ġslam kültürünün ve medeniyetinin farkındaydı. Aynen yine çağdaĢları ve ceditçilik 
hareketinin diğer mensupları gibi: Musa Carullah gibi, Sultangaliyev gibi, ve 
diğerleri gibi.  Çok küçük yaĢta, 5 aylıkken daha babasını kaybetti, sonra annesini 
kaybetti 3 yaĢında. Aynen aslında o nesil kültür dünyasında kendisini hem öksüz 
hem yetim hissetmesini, yani yükselen batı karĢısında kendi ati olduğu kültürün 
öksüz ve yetim hissetmesi gibi, bu Ģekilde yaĢadı. Mutiyullah Medresesi‟nde okudu, 
ama medreseyle de yüzleĢti. Yine aynen benzer Ģekilde Mehmet Akif‟in o zamanki 
medreselere yaptığı eleĢtiriler gibi, ama aynı gelenekten gelerek Ġslam kültürüne olan 
güçlü aidiyetle. Türkçe‟yi en öz, güzel Ģekliyle kullandı Abdullah Tukay. Ve o dili 
belki de yaĢatan, o coğrafyalarda yaĢatan, büyük eserlere imza attı. Doğu ve Batı 
felsefelerini buluĢturdu, bir erdemi, bir kültürü yansıttı. Yine Ģu dizelere baktıktan 
sonra Mehmet Akif‟i hatırlamamak mümkün mü? Biraz daha öztürkçeyle diyelim, 
Ģöyle diyor bir Ģiirinde: Ġyilik karĢısında eririm ben, balmumuyum / Överim iyi 
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Ģeyleri, tatlı dilliyim / Kötülüğü kınarım, övemem / O hususta pek katıyım, 
affedemem. Bunu Safahat‟ın bazı beyitlerinin öztürkçeleĢtirilmiĢ Ģekli gibi 
düĢünebilirsiniz.  
 Mehmet Akif,  Ġpek‟te doğmuĢtu Makedonya‟da; Abdullah Tukay Kazan‟da, 
Tatarstan‟da. Ama ortak bir kültürü paylaĢıyorlardı, ortak bir heyecanı taĢıyorlardı. 
Ve ait oldukları kültürün o zamanki bir psikolojisi itibariyle düĢüĢe geçmiĢ bir kültür 
olmasına isyan ediyorlardı. Ve iddia ediyorlardı ki o kültür, o dil, Türkçe, o 
medeniyet, Türk-Ġslam medeniyetinin değiĢik versiyonlarının, hala bütün dünyaya 
ileteceği bir mesaj vardı. O mesajı taĢımak için 26 yıla çok güzel bir Türkçe, çok 
güzel bir edebiyat literatürü bıraktı ve bir köprü oldu. Sadece Ģiir yazmadı, sadece 
sanat icra etmedi, aynı zamanda o zamanki sosyal hareketliliğin içinde yer aldı. 
Tarihin sorumluluğunu, gereğini, yerine getirdi. Bütün sosyal hareketlerde bulundu. 
Gazeteler çıkardı, Asr-ı Cedit gibi. Dergiler çıkardı, susmadı. Tarihin, bulunduğu 
mekanın hakkını verdi, bulunduğu tarihi dönemin sözcüsü oldu.  
 Son olarak Ģunu da Abdullah Tukay‟la ilgili, söylemek isterim, bazı insanlar 
vardır yaĢadığı dönemde etkili olurlar. Bazı insanlar hayatları ne kadar kısa süre 
olursa olsun, sonraki nesillere birĢeyler aktarırlar. O 26 yaĢ yaĢadı, ama, burada biz 
onun 124. doğumgününü kutluyoruz. Aslında hala yaĢıyor güzel Türkçe‟siyle. Ve 
aslında ondan sonra eğer Avrasya steplerinde standartlaĢmıĢ bir Türkçe kalmıĢsa, 
onun hemen hemen her Türk lehçesinde yayınlanmıĢ Ģiirlerinin etkisi büyüktür: 
Kırgızca, Özbekçe, BaĢkurtça, Türkçe, her dilde. Bugün biz böylesine coğrafyaları 
yatay olarak kesen ve yine böylesine tarihi asırları dikey olarak kesebilen aydınlar 
ihtiyacımız var. Onun için biz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti DıĢiĢleri Bakanlığı olarak 
Abdullah Tukay‟ı bugün anmayı gerekli gördük. Onun için bu bayrağın yaĢaması 
gerektiğini düĢünüyoruz. Onun için bu bayrak hem ait olduğumuz büyük Türk 
kültürünün bayrağıdır, hem Türk-Rus kültür dostluğunun bayrağıdır, hem Asya‟dan 
Avrupa‟ya uzanan o büyük kültür hareketinin bayrağıdır. Ben Stratejik Derinlik‟in 
bir yerinde Ģunu ifade etmeye çalıĢmıĢtım: Türklerin Avrupa‟yla Asya arasındaki 
seferi, stratejisi, ok - yay iliĢkisi gibidir. Yayı Asya‟nın derinliğine doğru ne kadar 
gererseniz, oku Avrupa‟nın ufuklarına doğru o kadar uzağa atabilirsiniz. Abdullah 
Tukay kendi tecrübesiyle bana bunu öğretmiĢti. Ceditçilik harekti böyle bir hareketin 
sözcüsüydü; onlardan öğreneceğimiz çok Ģey var. Hep beraber büyük bir serüvene 
yürümeye hazır olmalıyız. Bu serüven AbdürreĢid Ġbrahim gibi heybesini sırtına alıp 
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gezmeyi gerektirir, Yusuf Akçura gibi bir köĢede yazdığı bir kitabı dünyanın 
ülkesinde yayınlamayı gerektirirse bunu yapıcaz. Ve bütün dünyaya vereceğimiz bir 
mesajımız olduğunu hiç unutmayacağız. Her sene Abdullah Tukay‟ı anarken bunu da 
anmıĢ olacağız.  
Ve bir Ģeyi daha burada, sayın Büyükelçimiz de buradayken, vurgulamak 
istiyorum. Abdullah Tukay üzerinden, Tataristan üzerinden, Timur Bey ve sayın 
CumhurbaĢkanı ġeymiyev‟le çok uzun dönem beraber olduk. Onun erdemli 
yönetimiyle, aslında Tataristan Türkiye‟yle Rusya arasında büyük bir dostluk 
köprüsü olmuĢtur, olmaya da devam edecektir.  
 
Retrieved as an audio file on 10 October 2011 from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bakan-
davutoglu_nun-tatar-milli-sairi-abdullah-tukay_in-124_-dogumgunu-vesilesiyle-
gerceklestirilen-anma-programindaki-konusmasi.tr.mfa> 
Transcription belongs to the author of the thesis. 
